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This Graduate thesis covers the Franco-German Relationship and its impact on the security of Western Europe from post WWII to present. A chapter is devoted to the relationship's role as a catalyst in the organization of the Schuman Plan, Plevin Plan (EDC), and WEU. The thesis then concentrates on defense cooperation between the two countries since their 1982 Defense Initiative. The European Community (EC), NATO, and Western European Union (WEU) are used as the principal vehicles by which the Franco-German relationship and its role in Western European security is presented.

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

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Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in  
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Norman Furniss, Chairman  
William Cohen  
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# DEDICATION

To my newborn son of just three weeks, Benjamin. May you be as proud of your father in the coming years as he is of you right now.



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- M.E.T.  
Bloomington, Indiana  
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## INTRODUCTION

A key aspect of security in Europe has long been the relationship between the French and Germans. When the two countries did not get along, the rest of Europe paid the steep price of war. By the end of World War II, a war which marked the third time that France had been invaded by Germany in seventy years, it became apparent that reconciliation between the two peoples would be essential to lasting peace in Europe. To France and Germany, the task was even more crucial. If they were to avoid mutual destruction, lasting reconciliation would have to be achieved.

Great leaders and politicians like Adenauer, de Gaulle and Robert Schuman all recognized the need for French-German reconciliation but their ideas and convictions alone would not be enough to overcome such a great hurdle. Institutions, as suggested by Jean Monnet and his belief that "nothing is possible without people, yet nothing is lasting without institutions," would be necessary. This approach would assure lasting mutual cooperation and commitment to peace through economic, political and military integration.

The Franco-German relationship played an important part in the new European security arrangement by serving as a catalyst for the early formation and success of such Western European institutions as the European Community (EC) and Western European Union (WEU). It also helped shape the character of the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As the years have progressed, the Franco-German relationship has played a major role in the functioning of these institutions by providing leadership, initiative, direction, and an example for more extensive integration efforts. In my presentation of the Franco-German relationship and its importance to Europe, I will intentionally make little mention of Britain's role. This is because Britain chose, early on, to remain distant from the political and economic process of postwar Europe. Following the war, Britain found itself in a position of being not quite like France or Germany, since Britain had won the war, its economy remained relatively intact and it maintained its Commonwealth ties. Yet, Britain was no longer the major power that it was. Britain was somewhere in between, struggling to find its role in the new international scheme of things. Consequently, Britain did not apply for membership in the Community until 1963 (was finally admitted in 1973) and never developed the close relationship that existed between the two largest continental powers, France and West Germany.

Although the EC, NATO and WEU have taken on varying degrees of political and economic identity over the years, their foundations were largely based on issues of security and, consequently, security remains a key element. The Franco-German relationship has, by playing a crucial role in these institutions, become an important part of the European security process.

The purpose of this thesis will be to provide a study of the

Franco-German relationship and its role in the security of Western Europe from WWII to present. This will primarily be done by illustrating the impact of the Franco-German relationship on the West European institutions of the EC, NATO, and WEU, as they pertain to security. The notion of security can entail a great many things. I will, for the most part, deal with the military aspect of security. Other aspects of security will, however, be touched upon, with particular attention given to the notion of economic security. Economic security has been an important part of the relationship between France and West Germany and has at times, as will be discussed in chapter two dealing with the European Community, taken precedence over military security concerns.

I will attempt to argue that the major role which the Franco-German relationship has played in European security, from after World War II to the present, will continue despite the trying times of political, economic and military change presently sweeping across Europe.

This thesis will consist of five chapters. Chapter One will present the role of the Franco-German relationship in the creation of the postwar institutions of the European Economic Community, NATO, and the Western European Union (WEU). In Chapter Two, I will discuss how the French-Germans made use of the European Community to nurture mutual confidence in their relationship and eventually to exercise strong leadership in the Community and in the Community's limited role in security matters. I will use



Chapter Three to introduce the 1982 Franco-German defense initiative and other Franco-German cooperative efforts in defense, such as joint exercises and the introduction of the Franco-German Brigade, and I will discuss their impact on NATO and security in Europe. Chapter Four will be devoted to discussing the impact of the Franco-German relationship on the WEU. The final chapter will be used to introduce the current changes taking place in Europe, especially the issue of German unification, and will discuss their impact on the institutions of the EC, NATO and WEU. I will then discuss why and how I believe the Franco-German relationship will be able to survive the current turmoil and continue to play a leading role in the emerging new European political, economic and military landscape.

## CHAPTER 1

### THE POST FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONSHIP AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF WESTERN EUROPE

Immediately after WWII, the overriding concern of the nations of Europe was to ensure that such a war would never again occur. For many, that meant finding a solution to the German problem, or the problem of trying to fit a united and growing Germany, possessing threatening economic and military potential, into an already cramped and established Europe of nation-states. Only by finding a solution to this problem, the base of conflict in Europe for more than a century, could there be hopes of lasting peace for the peoples of Europe.

The postwar set-up of military zones by the occupying powers of the U.S., Russia, Great Britain, and later France, was largely designed to assist in the solution. The occupation arrangement was to be temporary until the allies could determine the best way to reestablish a new Germany with guaranteed safeguards against any future German military threat or aggression.

An additional requirement for lasting peace in Europe, for which there was little taste in 1945, was the need for reconciliation between two of the greatest nations of Europe: France and Germany. Mutual distrust and hatred between the two countries had led to three wars in seventy years and numerous military conflicts for centuries. To overcome such historical

animosity would not be an easy task, especially immediately after WWII when the reports of the atrocities of German prison camps and the misdeeds and exploitation of the German occupation forces in France were just starting to come to the fore. Shortly after the war, one and a half million prisoners of war and deported workers returned from Germany. Other figures revealed that of 108,000 French "racial" deportees, only 3,500 survived and of 112,000 Resistance and political deportees, only 35,000 came home.<sup>1</sup> The hatred between the two countries was well founded and well entrenched after the second World War.

Ironically, the first talk of a need for a new understanding between the French and Germans was heard from the French resistance.<sup>2</sup> Perhaps, as soldiers, their firsthand experience of the terrible manifestations of such hatred made clear the paramount need for reconciliation. Unfortunately, there were few who would listen in 1945. At that time, it was unimaginable, that in just seventeen years the leader of the Free French movement, as head of the French state, would hail the Franco-German partnership before cheering crowds of Germans.<sup>3</sup>

In this, the first chapter of the thesis, I will present a historical account of the early evolution of the Franco-German relationship and its importance to European integration efforts immediately following WWII. This will provide the groundwork necessary for later chapters and will assist the reader in understanding why the relationship continues to play such an important role in European security as affected by the

institutions of the European Community, NATO and WEU.

I will begin by discussing the evolution of the Franco-German relationship just after the war and show how and why the deep hatred between the two turned into mutual cooperation and friendship. I will show why concern over security remains at the heart of the relationship and why the idea of mutual trust is so important. Early motivations for seeking rapprochement, the influence of leaders like de Gaulle and Adenauer, and the ups and downs of the relationship will be presented. I will then discuss the important role Franco-German rapprochement played in early efforts to institutionalize European integration in the form of the Schuman Plan, European Defense Community and Western European Union. Finally, I will discuss the cultural, economic and political events leading up to the Franco-German Treaty of 1963, as well as the agreement's content.

#### De Gaulle and French Security Concerns

Immediately following the war, the French, led by the powerful personality of Charles De Gaulle, were little interested in rapprochement with Germany. Instead, the single most important objective was to ensure that French security concerns were satisfied with respect to the formation of a future German nation. The French not only wanted the assurance that a postwar Germany would never be able to establish a military power and once again threaten peace and cause havoc on the peoples of Europe, but insisted that France's own specific security concerns merited their say in how the settlement would come about. De Gaulle, in

his September 1944 address to the Conseil National de la Resistance, emphasized that "the decisions which tomorrow will determine the fate of Germany should not be discussed and adopted without France... To decide without France anything that concerns Europe would be a grave error."<sup>4</sup> He told President Truman in August of 1945 that the German Question was a French concern dating back centuries. He emphasized that in the three invasions of France by Germany in the past seventy years France had lost men, property, and national unity. France, therefore, had the right and duty to demand guarantees for its own security. These rights included the separation of the Rhineland from the future German state, internationalization of the Ruhr region, the economic merging of the Saar with France, and the abolition of centralized power in Germany.<sup>5</sup>

France's insistence on the above mentioned guarantees for security resulted in what the other allies perceived as extremely uncooperative and often disruptive behavior with respect to negotiations among the occupying powers of the military zones (and would also put a strain on Franco-German relations and hinder European integration efforts for years to follow). French intransigence, particularly with respect to any proposals hinting toward the centralization of German administration, resulted in France's continued use of its veto power and the subsequent stifling of the Control Council.

As the French continued to maintain their unyielding approach, much more significant differences were emerging between

the East and West on the future political, economic, and military make-up of the new Germany. Things came to a head in April of 1947 with the creation of the US-British bizon, originally an economic fusion of the two military zones. The action seemed simultaneously to signal the acceleration of the Cold War, a death blow to a satisfactory solution to the German Question, and bring a change in heart on the French position.

The French Begin to Bend:  
Integration as a Solution to the German Problem Is Suggested

The successful formation of the bizon and the mounting tension between East and West led France to the conclusion that it needed to cooperate or risk being left to the side. Georges Bidault, the French Foreign Minister, announced to the National Assembly that France now conceived of the solution to the German Problem as "the integration of a peaceful Germany in a united Europe, a Europe in which the Germans, feeling secure in their position, will be able to give up all idea of dominating Europe."<sup>6</sup>

Bidault's statement opened the way for the London Conference of early 1948 in which France agreed to discuss the possibility of a trizon fusion. But the resulting London agreements only increased tensions. France felt ignored over the Western allies' pressing needs for Germany in the wider East-West security scenario. Finding themselves at the lower end of the bargaining table, the French found it necessary to make compromises in allowing some centralization of Germany and agreeing to an arrangement in which the eventual control of Ruhr assets would be

given to the representative government of Germany. The cost of the French concessions was the formation of the International Authority for the Ruhr (IAR), designed to ensure the economic security of France by assuring it supplies of German coal, and the creation of the Military Security Board to "ensure the maintenance of disarmament and demilitarization in the interests of security [and] carry out the proper inspections and make the necessary recommendations to the military governors, who decide the action to be taken."<sup>7</sup>

The London Agreements worsened Franco-German relations. The Germans, of course, resented the French imposed shackles of the IAR and Military Security Board; they would remain continued reminders of Germany's subservient status and of French distrust. Strong French criticism of the Agreements, considered as needless yielding to American pressure and providing too weak guarantees to security, further fueled German resentment.<sup>8</sup> Fifteen months after the London Agreements, when the French finally acquiesced to the forming of the trizone or fusion of the Western zones, tensions between France and Germany were still high.

Adenauer Gives Impetus to Idea of Franco-German  
Reconciliation in the Realm of Wider European Integration

In his speech to the Allied High Commission on 21 September 1949, Konrad Adenauer publicly recognized the significance of the formation of the new federal German government and politely thanked the Allies for their efforts in saving the German people from starvation. But Adenauer also made it clear that he did not

see the formation of the federal government as a means and ends in itself. Further freedoms and the true power of self-government were still to be had. He also emphasized that Germany would work in close economic cooperation with other nations, with a viable European federation as the ultimate goal.<sup>9</sup>

During the months that followed the inauguration of the federal German government, Konrad Adenauer, and his vision of Germany in an integrated Europe, were to play a crucial role in the eventual improvement of Franco-German relations and the acceptance of West Germany, through emerging international institutions, as an equal partner with other Western nations.

As he points out in his memoirs, Adenauer, from the very start of the Federal Republic, continually sought to attain full sovereignty for his country.<sup>10</sup> He recognized that this had to be done gradually, often at the expense of sharp criticism from his fellow countrymen who wanted all too quickly to shed the restraints and controls of the occupying powers. Adenauer's view was one of a larger picture of Germany and its place in the emerging Europe of the mid-twentieth century. He realized that the integration of West Germany into the West was the most favorable course of action since the original goal of reunifying Germany was fast fading in light of the increased repression of democracy in the Soviet occupied military zone. Adenauer saw alignment with the West as the only means of eventual reunification of Germany in freedom.<sup>11</sup>

Having made the choice to align with the West, Adenauer



established the basic principles upon which he based his policy in dealing with the High Commission: the well-being of West Germany, reconciliation with France, and the unification of Europe. To this end he fought strongly with the High Commissioners for Germany's immediate return to economic and political independence, knowing full well his strong card lay in the fact that the political and economic success of Western Germany was in the vital security interests of the West. Adenauer also recognized that the new Germany had to avoid the dangers of "nationalistic blindness" and "moral slackening" first, by seeking reconciliation with France, and second by working untiringly toward the integration of Western Europe.<sup>12</sup>

Although the events of 21 September 1949 were relatively upbeat, the underlying tensions between Germany and the allies, particularly France, could not be ignored. In the nine months that followed, Franco-German relations would reach their lowest point since the end of the war.<sup>13</sup> Tensions between France and Germany would increase with the passing of several major events: the French Assembly debates on the Atlantic Pact and Council of Europe, the Petersburg Protocol, the Franco-Saar Conventions, and finally the proposal for Franco-German union by Konrad Adenauer.

For several months following the July-August French debates on the Atlantic Pact and the Council of Europe, the repercussions of the publicly expressed negative attitudes on the part of many French politicians, in particular the continued fear of Germany and dissatisfaction with the progress of denazification voiced by

members of the extreme left and right parties, hindered relations between the two countries. Reservations on the part of the French government toward the eventual admission of West Germany to the existing organizations of Western Europe only fueled mistrust between the two countries and made clear France's unpreparedness for reconciliation with Germany.

The Petersburg Protocol, preceded by Adenauer's concession of German willingness to participate in the International Authority for the Ruhr (IAR) and to support the work of the Military Security Board as an attempt to break the diplomatic deadlock, likewise did little to further Franco-German relations. The 24 November signing of the Petersburg Protocol, by the Allies and the federal government, stated as its primary objective the integration of the Federal Republic as a peaceful member of the European community. It also recommended West German membership to the Council of Europe, receipt of Marshall Plan aid, and cessation of the dismantling of German industries.<sup>14</sup> The French reaction to the agreement was generally one of disdain. They resented the decision reached at the international level and viewed the protocol as a step in the wrong direction, furthering centralization in Germany and threatening French security. The Gaullists reaction to worsening Franco-German relations was to emphasize their vision of a new Europe, the kernel of which would be a "Franco-German entente, an entente that will for the most part resolve the specifically Franco-German problems... A direct entente, without intermediary."<sup>15</sup> As accurate as the Gaullists'

vision has proven itself to be, the relationship at this particular time in history was worsening rather than improving. Additionally, another major obstacle lay in the path of Franco-German reconciliation: the Saar problem.

The economic union of the Saar with France, completed on 1 April 1948, was still a serious point of contention between the two countries. the problem was great enough that it tended to distort all relations between the countries and magnify any grievances.<sup>16</sup> The Saar Conventions, signed on March 3, 1950, were designed to "perpetuate the autonomy of the Saar in the framework of the Franco-Saar economic union."<sup>17</sup> The Saar Conventions had the effect of reinforcing French control over the Saar, infuriating the Germans and adding to the mistrust and deepening divide between the countries.

#### Adenauer's Call for French-German Union

Adenauer, in recognizing the dreadful state of Franco-German relations, and subsequently the stifled progress towards true peace and integration of Europe, made a bold and profound gesture on 9 March, just days after the Saar convention. On this day, Adenauer suggested the complete unification of France and Germany beginning with a "customs union and a customs parliament like those which unified Germany after the Napoleonic wars." Once established, government appointed representatives would work with this economic parliament toward the complete unification of the two countries. In light of the difficulty being experienced by the Council of Europe, this plan, according to Adenauer,

represented "the sole possibility for achieving European unity."<sup>18</sup>

The proposal was not taken seriously by the French. The French reaction was more of disbelief, figuring that it was another ploy by Adenauer to appease the Americans. Consequently, no official action was taken.<sup>19</sup> There was a response, however, from the Gaullist camp. In an interview on 16 March 1950, de Gaulle was asked to comment on Adenauer's proposal for Franco-German unity. His reply included his support of the Franco-German Saar union, but also his deep conviction that "the fate of European and in a large measure that of the world" was dependent on Franco-German relations.<sup>20</sup>

The importance of Franco-German rapprochement to peace in Europe was clear. A healthy Franco-German relationship was both essential and paramount to the launching of Western European integration and the hopes of lasting peace in Europe. Few could argue otherwise. The problem was how to overcome the great impasse in Franco-German relations in a way which would satisfy the nationalistic needs of the renewed Federal Republic of Germany while adequately addressing the security concerns of France and the rest of Western Europe.

The solution to such a formidable impasse would require a profound new approach to European integration, one which would eventually be offered by the Foreign Minister of France.

#### The Schuman Plan as the Answer

On May 9, 1950, Robert Schuman revealed a proposal that would break the Franco-German deadlock and launch European integration.

Schuman announced Jean Monnet's plan for the European Coal and Steel Community which would "place all Franco-German coal and steel production under a common High Authority, in an organization open to the participation of the other countries of Europe." The pooling of coal and steel production, said Schuman, would immediately "assure the establishment of common bases for economic development, which is the first stage for European federation, and will change the destiny of those regions which have long been devoted to the production of arms to which they themselves were the first to fall constantly victim".<sup>21</sup> Although the proposal was economic in nature, the primary motive was political: "to end Franco-German hostility once and for all," as Schuman later wrote.<sup>22</sup> The ECSC Treaty, also known as the Paris Treaty, was signed on 18 April, 1951.

For France, this represented a radical new departure: a policy of security through co-operation with West Germany rather than by defensive alliances. Security planning seemed to dominate the French decision to offer the Schuman plan. An April 1950 memorandum to Prime Minister Bidault described the ECSC as a means of controlling West German industrial revitalization and of eliminating the possibility of renewed French-West German hostilities.<sup>23</sup> West Germany's Adenauer also embraced the idea as it promised to put the Federal Republic on equal terms in the international community and would firmly attach West Germany to the West.<sup>24</sup>

The Schuman Plan offered a viable means to put an end to

Franco-German hostility, to include opening the way for an eventual settlement on the Saar issue by placing the Saar in the hands of the ECSC's High Authority. The ECSC represented a practical and long lasting way for the two countries to build the trust and confidence in one another essential for creating the close bilateral relationship which would emerge in the years and decades following the signing of the ECSC Treaty on 18 April 1951. Adenauer had no reservations about pointing out the importance of building this trust: "For Germany and for Europe everything depended on overcoming the mistrust that had fed on three Franco-German wars."<sup>25</sup>

The Franco-German relationship was a catalyst in the process of forming one of the earliest and most important institutions of European integration. The arrangement also had considerable impact on future security in Western Europe. The ECSC, in theory, would make war impossible because the basic resources of war - iron, coal and steel- would be tied up in a supranational body, making the launching of another major European conflict by a single nation impossible.<sup>26</sup>

#### The Pleven Plan: Failed Attempt at Integrating Defense

In as much as the Schuman Plan, based on the idea of economic integration, was a success, the first efforts toward defense integration in Western Europe were a dismal failure. Schuman's hopes that the ECSC would prepare the way for the gradual integration of Western Europe were shattered with the news of the invasion of South Korea by the Communist North on June 25, 1950.<sup>27</sup>

The parallel between the invasion of the divided Koreans and the divided Germanies was all too obvious. This, combined with the heavy commitment of U.S. troops to the Korean conflict, led the United States to review its defense structure; the conclusion was that NATO forces in Europe were inadequate to repel a conventional attack from the east.<sup>28</sup> Intensive pressure by the U.S. for the rearmament of West Germany and for its participation in Western security followed.

The idea of rearming the Germans and the renewed existence of a German army alarmed West Germany's immediate neighbors, particularly France. However, considering that the U.S. held most of the cards in the form of Marshall aid that could be tied to the rearmament of Germany as well as the threat of complete withdrawal from Western Europe, the eventual rearmament of Germany was likely to occur. On October 24, French Prime Minister, René Pleven, proposed a compromise solution that would meet the U.S. demands for the rearmament of Germany while satisfying West Germany's neighbors' fears of an autonomous German army. Under the Pleven plan, a European international army would be created to which Germany would commit all of its troops, while the other participants would commit only a portion of their armies.<sup>29</sup>

A Treaty on the proposed European Defense Community (EDC) was signed in May of 1952 under a shroud of controversy and disagreement. The subsequent ratification debates in the French National Assembly revealed a deep division among the French. Supporters claimed that the EDC would prevent the creation of an

autonomous German national army, and further Franco-German rapprochement and European integration.<sup>30</sup> Opposing views varied considerably, from outright refusal of German rearmament, to reluctance to accept the idea because of the perceived loss of French sovereignty, to belief that the plan would hinder European integration.<sup>31</sup> The furious debates which followed, due as much to the conflict among political parties characteristic of internal French politics of the time as to disagreement on the EDC issue, ended with the failure of the French to ratify the treaty. Paul Reynard lamented afterwards that a "great French idea" had been killed.<sup>32</sup> The anti-German sentiment expressed in the debates prompted Adenauer's expression of his disappointment with the French attitude. "We Germans," he told the French, "have on numerous occasions spoken of, and equally given proof of, our goodwill toward France and our firm resolution to make common cause with France in the future: in my opinion, one ought not to waken distrust... distrust is contagious, and provokes more distrust."<sup>33</sup> The French failure to ratify the Treaty, combined with the absence of the British, and the opposition of the Italians, led to the death of the EDC as well as the parallel work which had begun on the makings of a European Political Community.

With the defeat of the EDC, European unification was brought to a standstill. The plan's defeat brought a wave of anti-French sentiment from Western Europe and the United States. The French had seemingly betrayed the very unification movement which they had given life to with the introduction of the Schuman plan and



had done so in a manner that revealed anti-German as well as anti-European tendencies.<sup>34</sup>

#### The British Proposal for the WEU

The idea of European unity had reached an impasse with the failure of the EDC and finding a way to overcome the predicament was becoming more and more urgent as the need for West Germany to join NATO was growing, the ECSC was under siege, and the Saar problem was worsening with the majority of its people voting to rejoin West Germany. The British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden sensed the urgency of the situation and was determined to find a solution. After long contemplation, he came up with the alternative to the EDC for which he had been desperately seeking. Realizing that any solution would have to include West Germany's admission to NATO as well as win the consent of France, he decided that the Brussels Treaty could be used to do the job.<sup>35</sup> Until that time, the Brussels Treaty, signed in March of 1948, by Britain, France, and the Benelux countries, had served as little more than a mutual-defense agreement, and had been largely superseded by NATO.<sup>36</sup>

Eden's idea offered several imaginative approaches to the problems of the failed EDC. Eden's proposed extension of the Brussels Treaty would do away with the supranational features offered by the EDC and would additionally include the active participation of Britain; the failure of the British to participate in the EDC was considered by some to be one of the major contributors to the EDC's demise. The Western European

Union (WEU), as it was later called, would include Italy and West Germany. A major stumbling block to Eden's plan, however, was France's original refusal to allow West Germany to join NATO.

Eden's efforts to convince the French that West Germany should become a member of NATO finally paid off when, during the September 28- October 3, 1954 London conference, Pierre Mendès-France, the French Premier, announced that he had changed his mind. He set forth three prerequisites for the Federal Republic's admission to the Atlantic Pact: adoption of controls on German rearmament, agreement on the Saar, and a promise by Britain and the U.S. to keep troops in Europe for fifty years.<sup>37</sup> Mendès-France's first concern, the control of German rearmament, was later to be addressed by the Armaments Control Agency, under the control of the Council of the WEU, and by NATO, whose commander would exercise supreme authority over all NATO troops in Europe.<sup>38</sup> His insistence on a resolution to the Saar problem was at first delayed but finally resolved after an agreement was reached between France and West Germany on June 5, 1956. The Saar was officially united with West Germany on January 1, 1957, giving a substantial boost to Franco-German rapprochement. Mendès-France's request for British and American commitment to the continent resulted in renewed guarantees from the Americans and the historic announcement by Eden that Britain would maintain four divisions and a tactical air force in Europe for at least the fifty-year duration of the Brussels Treaty.

The WEU proposal by Britain, an attempt to resolve the

impasse among the allies on the German problem of rearmament and mend irreconcilable differences between France and Germany, would have a major impact on the nature of European defense for decades to follow. Although the operational defense responsibilities of the WEU would be delegated to NATO in the years which followed, the signing of the WEU agreement in London on October 3, 1954, and the subsequent Paris agreements signed later that month, resulted in the end of the occupation in Germany, the regaining of sovereignty by West Germany, the admission of the Federal Republic and Italy to the Brussels Pact, and the invitation to West Germany to join NATO.

The success of the WEU, and earlier ECSC, lay in the ability of both plans to adequately overcome Franco-German mistrust and differences while providing a stepping stone towards greater European unity and lasting peace in Europe. The Franco-German relationship thus served as a catalyst to early European integration efforts and profoundly influenced the character of the institutions of the WEU, ECSC and NATO.

#### The Franco-German Treaty of Cooperation

The success of the ECSC and WEU also had the effect of creating a feeling of goodwill between the two countries, giving a considerable boost to the ongoing efforts behind the scenes to improve Franco-German relations. Since the end of World War II, private individuals, churches and political groups had been working to improve Franco-German relations at the "people level" where they felt true reconciliation of the two countries had to

begin. To this end, numerous French-German societies and associations were formed. By 1959, some 35 Franco-German societies had been officially recognized.<sup>39</sup> The Sister City Movement, involving local community mayors of neighboring French and German towns, also began shortly after the war and played an important role in the reconciliation of the two peoples.<sup>40</sup> On the business level, business leaders had begun to expand trade relations and promote exchanges between business men as early as 1949.<sup>41</sup>

The momentum of these personal, cultural and economic exchanges provided an excellent example to those who were carefully watching the progress of early European cooperation and integration efforts, and eventually, along with the political developments from 1954 to 1963, led to the institutionalization of the Franco-German relationship in the form of the 1963 Franco-German Friendship Treaty.

Since the signing of the WEU agreement in 1954, several important political events occurred which would also have an impact on the signing of the Franco-German Treaty in 1963. De Gaulle came to power in 1959 as the first president of the French Fifth Republic. The powers that the new French constitution invested in the president and de Gaulle's own strong personality combined to put the General in a position of leadership in the emerging new European political order of the late 50's and 60's. Two of de Gaulle's stronger convictions, his desire to keep the British from rivaling France's center position of power and

influence in the Community and his push for a more confederated Europe, played an important role in his decision to sign the Franco-German friendship treaty in 1963.

De Gaulle's efforts to further the idea of a more confederate European structure had failed when, on 17 April 1962, a Paris meeting of the Community foreign ministers resulted in a tabling of any plans for a political union of Europe. When the British applied for membership to the Community a short time after, in January of 1963, their application was vetoed by de Gaulle who was not about to see France's position of power in a non-confederate Europe compromised. De Gaulle then pushed to speed up the signing of the Franco-German treaty requested by West Germany. By signing the treaty, the General gained the advantage of enhancing France's power and influence in Europe at a time when Britain was knocking at the door. He also kept alive his idea for a more confederated Europe because the treaty set up the means for closer cooperation between the two countries which were strikingly similar to those de Gaulle had suggested for a European confederation.<sup>42</sup>

The timing of the signing of the Franco-German treaty also told something about the West German leader Konrad Adenauer. Franco-German reconciliation had long been a high priority of the chancellor. Adenauer pushed for the signing of the treaty which would have to be ratified by the Bundestag and which would represent a more significant and longer lasting commitment than a protocol (an alternative with which de Gaulle originally would

have been satisfied).<sup>43</sup> The fact that Adenauer signed the treaty so soon after the veto of the British application for membership to the Community was indicative of the priority Adenauer gave to Franco-German relations above all else, save the American nuclear guarantee.

The Treaty of Cooperation established guidelines for highly structured communication and coordination between the two countries. Particularly significant was the program set up for regular meetings between French and German heads of state and governments. The heads of state and government would meet at least twice a year, the foreign ministers, ministers of defense, and education ministers every three months, and the youth and sports commissioners every two months.<sup>44</sup> These meetings, now known as Franco-German biannual summits and their interim coordination meetings, not only strengthened the relationship over the years, but have helped the Franco-German partnership to play a crucial role as leader and initiator in European affairs.

The second portion of the Treaty required that "the two Governments consult each other on all important matters of mutual interest, with a view to reaching, insofar as possible, a similar position." In defense matters, strategy and tactics were to be coordinated, personnel exchanged, and armament programs shared.<sup>45</sup>

The 1963 Treaty of Cooperation also gave added impetus to the existing cultural and personal exchange programs between the two countries. As an example, until 1962, some 126 town twinnings had been arranged. By 1983, more than 1000 links had been made.<sup>46</sup>

The signing of the Franco-German Treaty of Cooperation in 1963 was the crowning achievement of years of effort to overcome the differences between the two countries. The Treaty also represented the potential for a new motor for European unity in the form of a Franco-German core of consensus and cooperation.

Unfortunately, divergences in foreign policy objectives and changes in the international climate emerged shortly after the signing of the Treaty and effectively stifled the potential of the relationship to contribute to European unity. Disagreements about the Anglo-Saxon influence in Europe, de Gaulle's courtship of Russia, and Germany's Ostpolitik are just a few of the events which contributed to difficulties. Any contribution to European security by the Franco-German relationship would be temporarily delayed until the relationship had time to grow, until the mutual trust and confidence between the two partners was well established and the relationship earned the respect of their European neighbors. Additionally, time would be needed before the wounds of the EDC's failure healed and talk of any kind of European integrated defense effort would be tolerated.

In this chapter I have discussed the early evolution of the Franco-German relationship from one of hatred to mutual cooperation. In discussing the reasons each country had for seeking more friendly relations, the role of the countries' leaders in developing the relationship, and the efforts by others to tie Franco-German rapprochement in to institutional approaches to European integration, I have shown that security was, and

continues to be, a central concern of the relationship and that the ability of the French and Germans to overcome their mutual hatred and distrust is essential to lasting peace in Europe. I have discussed the important role the relationship played as a catalyst to early European integration efforts and have concluded with a presentation of the Franco-German Treaty as proof of how far along the notion of Franco-German rapprochement had developed by 1963.

Having laid the groundwork for a better understanding of the importance of Franco-German rapprochement to European security, I will begin the subsequent chapters in which I will discuss the role of the Franco-German relationship and how it affects European security through the institutions of the European Community, NATO and the WEU.



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## CHAPTER II

### THE FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONSHIP AND ITS IMPACT ON SECURITY WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (EC)

The previous chapter ended with an explanation of why the Franco-German Treaty of 1963 marked a high point in relations between the two countries and why, because of a number of differences in political objectives and the taboo associated with defense cooperation after the defeat of the EDC, significant progress in the area of security cooperation would have to wait. Time would first be needed for the relationship to grow, for mutual trust and confidence to be built, and for the Franco-German relationship to earn the respect of its European neighbors.

The vehicle which the French and Germans used to foster their relationship was the European Community (EC). In this chapter, I will discuss how, within the confines of the EC, the Franco-German relationship proved its worth as a dynamo for European unity, secured its role as initiator and leader of the EC, served as a model of bilateral cooperation, and later, as the Community began to concern itself with security matters, actively affected European security.

I will accomplish this by first explaining the different aspects of security upon which the European Community potentially can have an impact. I will then explain how the Franco-German partnership first established itself as a leader in EC policy during the time when the EC confined itself to mostly economic-

security matters. I will then discuss how the EC became involved in political-security matters, established the European Political Community (EPC), and later became involved in defense matters. During each of these phases of the EC's progressive involvement in matters of security, I will discuss the impact and importance of the Franco-German relationship.

Security, as it pertains to the European Community, can be defined in terms of territorial integrity, political sovereignty, unimpeded trade flow, and domestic and regional stability. Territorial integrity describes the more common use of the term security and relates not only to the physical defense of Europe against the Warsaw Pact but also to the presence and movement of foreign or allied troops within a country's boundaries. Political sovereignty, or the political dimension of security, deals with policy making and reaction to Soviet threats and blackmail as well as U.S. pressure for Europeans to accept certain policies. The need for unrestricted trade flow, or the economic dimension of security, touches upon such concepts as the vulnerability of the West's dependence on world trade and the protection of the transport and trade of raw materials, particularly oil. Domestic and regional stability concerns suggest that the legitimacy and support of the European Community depends on the efficiency of the EC and the growth of the Community.<sup>1</sup>

The European Community, since its conception, has taken action which has had an impact on various economic as well as some

political aspects of security as mentioned above. The majority of political and all of the military aspects of security, however, were left to NATO until recently. The advent of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1969/70 opened the door for EC dealings on the political dimension of security and the Single European act of 1987, amending the Treaty of Rome, authorized the EC to deal with defense matters in recognition that greater cooperation in the defense sector would be essential to the continued integration of the European economy.

The delay in the EC's dealing with the higher aspects of security, as relating to politics and defense, was due to the accepted wisdom in the 60s that European cooperation had to be built, slowly and indirectly, through economic cooperation and social integration. The process was slow but very important. It was important to the nations of Europe to advance gradually, and recover from the failure of the EDC, before taking any further steps toward the 'higher politics' of foreign policy and defense where the sovereignty of the nation state would be most at stake.<sup>2</sup> The gradual pace of European unity within the confines of the European Community were also important to the Franco-German relationship, for it was within the EC that the Franco-German partnership fostered and gained credibility. The absence of Great Britain in the Community until 1973 helped the Franco-German relationship to establish itself as the leader and dynamo of the European Community. The confidence and clout that the Franco-German relationship acquired within the mostly economic confines

of the EC enabled the relationship to make the jump to higher levels of cooperation and paved the way to their 1982 bilateral defense initiative.

#### Economic Aspects of the EC

The Franco-German relationship has served as the core and motor of the European Community. The initiatives and strong consensus provided by these two countries has been a major force directing the European Community policy since the EC's conception. The immense influence of the Franco-German relationship within the EC prompted the comment from Jerome Vigon, chief advisor of EC Commission President Jacques Delors, that "no important development in the European Community has ever occurred without the initiative, or at least the goodwill, of France and Germany."<sup>3</sup> This is, in part, due to the political and economic clout shared by these two countries. Together they make up 41% of intra-EC trade, 54% of the ECU's value, and contribute 47% of the EC's GNP.<sup>4</sup> But the countries must effectively manipulate that clout within the framework of the Community in order to influence decisions. It is important, therefore, to analyze just how Franco-German bilateral cooperation contributes to the leadership role that France and West Germany play in Community affairs, and how policy decisions in the Community are influenced by the Bilateral relationship. This can best be done by studying how Franco-German cooperation operates in each of characteristic institutions of the European Community.

The European Council. The Community "institution" upon which

Franco-German bilateral cooperation has the most profound influence is the European Council. The European Council actually exists outside of the official Community institutions, yet it is an important initiating and decision-making body. The influence of the European Council has grown to the point that it is now the pace setter for policy-making in the Community.<sup>5</sup> The role of the European Council has also grown over the years. The holding of regular summit meetings by the Heads of State and Government was agreed to at the 1969 Hague Conference. In 1974, the Heads of State agreed to meet three times a year in formal "summit" meetings with the purpose of providing strategic direction and to resolve issues that the Council of Ministers and Commission had not been able to resolve by the normal EC process. The European Council was given legal recognition in 1974 under the Single European Act.<sup>6</sup>

European Council summit meetings are extremely influential in Community policy-making for a number of reasons. The summit meetings (which occur at least twice a year as defined by the Single European Act) are highly visible affairs and can play an important role in swaying public opinion on given Community policies. They also provide a platform for initiatives to be presented. Finally, many of the more difficult issues that cannot be solved by the Council of Ministers or Commission, or which are too politically controversial at such levels, are left for the Heads of State to resolve.

France and Germany have together been particularly adept at



taking advantage of the power of the European Council in influencing Community policies. The two countries have been able to benefit by reaching a prior consensus on issues that are raised at the summit meetings. The coordination most often occurs in Franco-German bilateral summit conferences which are strategically planned to take place just prior to Community summit meetings. France and West Germany then attend the European summit as a unified block. Such tactics have allowed the Franco-German relationship to play a strong leadership role in the workings of the European Council.

The European Council has replaced the Commission as the motor of the Community. This was especially true during the Giscard d'Estaing-Schmidt era when the two cooperated closely to form a notable leadership role in the European Council.<sup>7</sup> By playing such an important role in the most influential decision-making body of the EC, the Franco-German relationship subsequently plays a major role in EC policy decisions.

**The Council of Ministers** Within the boundaries of official Community institutions, the Council is the most powerful in that it makes the final decision on Community affairs and policies. It is also the institution in which the member country governments have the most influence. Again, the Franco-German axis plays a major role in its operation.

As an example, when the different ministers of the twelve member countries get together to discuss an issue, a previously reached agreement by French and German ministers may serve as a

core of consensus that eventually leads to a Franco-German leadership role in the discussion process on that issue.

This is especially true in the Political Cooperation (Poco) forum of the Council of Ministers whereby the EC foreign ministers meet to discuss the coordination of foreign policy.<sup>8</sup>

When it is time for an eventual decision, the Franco-German axis holds considerable weight in the "blocking game." Since the total number of votes in the Council is 76, the necessary amount of votes needed to block a qualified majority is 23. France and Germany have ten votes each and only need to convince one of the other smaller countries (except the too small Luxembourg) to take their side in order to vote down a proposal.<sup>9</sup>

**The Commission.** The impact of Franco-German cooperation is considerably less on the Commission than on the European Council and Council of Ministers. The very nature of the Commission suggests that its members are responsible to the Community and not to their respective governments. The realities of agreements reached between France and Germany, however, are likely to influence the initiatives and decisions of the Commission. In addition, national loyalties are not easily forgotten and since the larger countries are afforded two commissioners instead of the single commissioner afforded smaller countries, a Franco-German axis can be a strong influence. The current Commission's role has also been affected by the Franco-German bilateral relationship. The presenting of initiatives at the European Council level, particularly French-German joint initiatives, has contributed to a

substantial loss of initiative at the Commission level.

**The European Parliament.** As the role of the Parliament is less powerful in the EC process of policy-making, so is the importance of Franco-German cooperation. Franco-German bilateral agreements do, however, result in a substantial block of votes in the EC parliamentary process. Of the existing 518 votes, France and Germany together account for 162.<sup>10</sup> Franco-German accords also spur opinion and may consequently affect the decisions reached by the representative members of Parliament.

There are many examples of the importance of the Paris-Bonn dialogue in policy-making decisions within the mostly economic confines of the EC. Some of the more important examples include the change in monetary policy by the establishment of the EMS, the settlement of British budget dispute that arose in 1979, and the second enlargement of the Community.<sup>11</sup>

#### Political-Security Aspects of the EC

Thus far, the impact of the Franco-German relationship on the European Community as it pertains to mostly economically related security issues has been discussed. The EC has, however, been involved in political aspects of security by way of sustained external relations, even though foreign (political) policy lies outside the scope of the Treaty of Rome. This is largely due to the difficulty in distinguishing between world trade and politics. In today's world, the two become easily intertwined.

It is not difficult to understand that the EC's foreign economic decision-making powers are likely to be influenced by the

members' political-diplomatic-security interests abroad. As the EC has grown in stature and effectiveness it has become more and more difficult to define the EC's external relations in strictly apolitical terms, divorced from broader U.S. - European relations. To become the world's largest importer/exporter implies the exercise of the accompanying political clout. The decision, for example, to grant or withhold foreign trade contracts, tariff preferences and other favorable trade terms, diplomatic recognition, and food, humanitarian or emergency aid to third countries requires EC members to consider political-diplomatic-security implications. Additionally, although the Treaty of Rome does not explicitly bind members to a foreign (political) policy, the prospect of a 'political union' is suggested by the preamble which states that the members "are determined to lay the foundation of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe." Thus, a common foreign policy is suggested as a natural progression.<sup>12</sup>

Action was taken in 1969 to meet the impending need for a convergence of foreign policy among the EC's members. European Political Cooperation (EPC), inspired by the Fouchet proposals of nearly ten years before, was agreed upon at the 2 December 1969 Hague summit in which the Heads of Government of the Member States of the EC instructed their foreign ministers to examine the question of how progress could be made in the field of political unification.<sup>13</sup> Given this mandate, the foreign ministers of the then six Member States of the European Community drew up the

Luxembourg Report of 27 October 1970 which outlined the aims and methods of foreign policy coordination within the EPC. The EPC quickly proved to be an extremely useful and effective forum for coordination among foreign ministers from 1972 on, particularly in the context of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Although there is little written on the particular contribution of the Franco-German relationship to the EPC, it can be reasoned that the cooperative partnership has played the same 'core' role in reaching consensus and initiating action within the EPC as it has in the EC.

In 1981, the political realm of the EPC's responsibilities was officially extended by the foreign ministers to include security issues. The London Report of 13 October 1981 expressly mentioned for the first time the political aspects of security as a subject of cooperation.<sup>14</sup> The London Report also endorsed closer relations between the European Parliament and the EPC. This marked a considerable reversal of the original intention to keep the EPC separate from the European Community, largely due to the insistence of the French. The EPC's membership nevertheless has always been conditional on (and identical with) Community membership because of the recognition that European perspectives on foreign policy and external economic relations are inherently linked. The EPC, for many years, was carried by the European Council which is made up of the Heads of State of the EC Member Nations who meet on a regular basis. The meetings of the European Council were superseded by quarterly meetings of the foreign

ministers.

The London Report and its call for a new outlook on security by the EC, as well as the call for lessening the separation between the EC and EPC, were part of a wider push for greater European identity in defense which emerged in the early 80s. The popularity of the Europeanization of defense movement gave the EC confidence enough to pursue the new direction in security while it simultaneously promised to enhance the image and clout of a European Parliament in desperate search of greater public support and sense of purpose.

#### The Europeanization of Defense

During the latter half of the 70s and early 80s, a number of developments in European politics and national perspectives resulted in a weakening of the taboo on European defense cooperation which had followed the disappointing defeat of the EDC in 1954. Perhaps the most important development was the successful evolution of European Political Cooperation (EPC) as a useful forum within the EC for foreign ministers to discuss security issues. Additionally, vehement public protest in Europe over INF and NATO's nuclear strategy reflected a widespread perception that European defense was being overpowered by American interests. Thirdly, European concern about the less than equal 'two-way street' between European and U.S. defense industries, increasing controls on the transfer of technology from the U.S., and tighter budgets within NATO combined to push European governments toward common procurement.<sup>15</sup> Fourth, Europeans were

becoming skeptical about American-Soviet bilateralism in nuclear arms control, American SDI plans, and repeated calls for American troop withdrawals. Finally, there was a growing need for a wider way to show solidarity of European cooperation that was bogged down by agricultural surpluses and budgetary arguments within the European Community.<sup>16</sup> Riding on the momentum of the movement for greater Europeanization of defense, an Italian-German initiative known as the Genscher-Columbo plan was introduced to the EC in November of 1981. The plan was an attempt to take the earlier London Report's efforts to commit the EC to security matters one step further. The Genscher-Columbo Plan, also known as the 'European Act,' sought to strengthen the common European outlook towards defense by enlarging the scope of the EPC to include all major dimensions of collective security. The initiative was effectively dismantled, however, by the 'Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart' in June of 1983 due to the reluctance of some of the EC countries, particularly Greece, Ireland, and Denmark, to deal with defense issues within the framework of the EPC.<sup>17</sup> The failure of the Genscher-Columbo Plan revealed the limitations of the EC as an effective forum for dealing with wider range security and defense issues.

#### Defense Aspects of the EC

Until 1987, the European Community was prohibited by the Treaty of Rome to deal with matters of defense. A major step toward a new direction on defense issues was begun on 29 June, 1985 at the European Council meeting in Milan. The Milan meeting

established the plan to hold an intergovernmental conference designed to "achieve concrete progress on European Union."<sup>18</sup> Part of the proposed endeavor toward greater European union was a plan to adopt a treaty on common foreign and security policy on the basis of the Franco-German and United Kingdom drafts.<sup>19</sup>

The intensive negotiations which took place at the follow-on conference resulted in the signing of the Single European Act of 1987. The Franco-German draft on a common foreign and security policy contributed to the enshrinement of the EPC into the international treaty which also covers the European Community and which calls for a greater defense role for the EPC. The Single European Act amends the Treaty of Rome, partially on the basis of the perception that greater cooperation among European defense industries is essential to the integration of the European economy.<sup>20</sup> The Act also calls for the close integration between the EPC's efforts and those of the EC.

The leadership role of the Franco-German relationship within the EC, combined with the undeniable link between economics, politics and security, suggest that the Franco-German relationship will continue to play a big part in security related issues within the realm of the EC. While the Single European Act enhances the EPC's role in security related matters, it expressly states that these provisions do not impede the extensive coordination of security and defense policy by several partners within the framework of NATO and WEU.<sup>21</sup> It is the role of the Franco-German partnership within the structure of these two institutions to



which the following two chapters will be devoted.

In this chapter, I have discussed how the Franco-German relationship used the mostly economic confines of the EC to nurture its bilateral partnership, building trust and confidence in each other and in their ability to lead the policy making process within the European Community. I have also shown how the partnership continued to play a major part in EC policy as the EC progressively involved itself with security matters, first embracing political-security concerns through the European Political Community (EPC), and later defense matters as a result of the Single European Act. As the European Community has become an increasingly important player in European security matters, the Franco-German relationship, through its influence as leader and initiator in the EC, has played a key role. The experience and confidence they gained through their success in the EC helped them to make the jump to significant defense cooperation in the form of their 1982 bilateral defense initiative, the subject of which will be discussed in the following chapter.

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### CHAPTER III

#### THE FRANCO-GERMAN DEFENSE INITIATIVE OF 1982 AND ITS IMPACT ON NATO

The success, mutual trust, and recognition which the Franco-German relationship experienced within the EC, combined with world events, led the two pioneers in bilateral cooperation to make an unprecedented move. The historically bitter enemies decided, in 1982, to extend their relationship of cooperation to include defense matters. This Franco-German defense initiative marked a substantially new and more in depth cooperative effort by the two countries which would have a significant impact not only on defense coordination between the two countries, but also on security and defense integration in Europe. This chapter will be devoted to presenting the content of, and motivations behind, the 1982 Franco-German defense initiative, after which I will explain the impact which the initiative and follow on Franco-German cooperation efforts in conventional and nuclear defense have had on NATO and other European defense integration efforts.

On 4 October of 1982 Mitterrand and Kohl, during their very first meeting, decided to initiate a new and stronger bilateral commitment to cooperation on European security issues. The idea for closer consultation on defense had first been breached by Mitterrand and Schmidt in February of 1982, but the February decision represented a much more ambitious step.<sup>1</sup>

The Franco-German summit on 20-1 October confirmed the new

commitment on the part of the two countries for much greater defense cooperation and coordination. During the summit meeting, defense ministers of France and West Germany met to establish procedures and guidelines. The previously underused clause of the Franco-Germany Treaty dealing with defense was resurrected to be used as the cornerstone of a new commitment to defense; one which promised a renewed vigor in tackling broad ranging security and disarmament issues, as well as pursuing closer coordination of joint defense policies. The summit of October 1982 differed from the regular talks on joint weapons production and other military issues which had taken place in the past for this summit marked the first time major strategic questions were aired in detail. Although the talks took place in secrecy, it is believed that discussion was held on previously taboo subjects such as the French nuclear deterrent and the modernization of French tactical nuclear forces stationed near the border in the Alsace. The fact that such matters were touched upon so early in the discussions attest to the significance of the new defense initiative.<sup>2</sup>

The October Summit also resulted in the institutionalization of cooperation between the two countries. Mitterand and Kohl decided that the defense and foreign ministers would convene at the biannual summits. A Permanent Commission on Security and Defense, meeting at the level of departmental undersecretaries, was created and three working groups dealing with issues of arms control, tactical cooperation, and defense procurement were formed. The groups were to meet on a regular basis and work

within a confidential framework.<sup>3</sup>

The new approach to defense cooperation initiated by Mitterand and Kohl would result in unprecedented nuclear and conventional defense cooperation between the countries in the years that followed. But these efforts at bilateral defense cooperation were not the first. Efforts to revitalize the defense provisions of the Franco-German Treaty had been attempted before and failed, particularly in the early 70's when Brandt's Ostpolitik, and the danger it suggested to French security interests, caused the French to seek a defense dialogue with the Germans. What was different in 1982 that made such efforts so successful? Part of the answer lies in the international climate of the early 80's which was dominated by renewed East-West tensions and the previously mentioned movement for the Europeanization of defense. The United States' reaction to the increasing East-West tensions was to pressure its allies to strengthen the alliance against the Soviet threat. The U.S. pushed for a commitment from the allies for a progressive annual increase of three per cent in their respective defense budgets as well as support for the deployment of long-range theater nuclear forces (TNF) in Germany, Italy, the Low Countries and Britain.<sup>4</sup>

West Germany, with its determination to maintain links with the GDR, despite rising East-West tensions, and with the increase in internal domestic dissent towards defense and foreign policy, subsequently became the focal point of European security.<sup>5</sup> It also made urgent the perceived need by French and German

officials for mutual defense cooperation.

#### French Motivations to Begin the New Defense Dialogue

For France, the need to pursue closer defense ties with West Germany stemmed, in part, from the realization on the part of the French that they needed to become a firmer partner in the Atlantic Alliance in response to growing instability in Europe.

Additionally, the French were worried about the neutralist drift in West German public opinion and its implications on the continued commitment of West Germany to the West.<sup>6</sup>

The French had, since de Gaulle's 1966 withdrawal of French forces from the NATO integrated command, used their relationship with West Germany as a "back door" to NATO. The stationing of French forces inside the West German border, the continued use of supply lines through France by the Germans, and the collaboration on arms procurement all helped France to keep one foot in NATO through a back door. The related discussions on topics of common defense has allowed French input to NATO defense concepts without commitment. That "back door" to NATO, however, became more and more important to the French as their views toward the Atlantic Alliance changed over the years. The turnaround in the French attitude toward NATO most likely began shortly after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, highlighting the Soviet threat to European stability and the reassertion of the dominance of military blocs.<sup>7</sup> By 1981, the French had slowly progressed to a foreign policy favoring support of NATO.

Mitterrand entered office in 1981, owing much of his campaign success to his criticism of the incumbent president's policy toward the Soviet Union, particularly Giscard's conciliatory attitude after the invasion of Afghanistan.<sup>8</sup> Once in office, Mitterrand made clear his intention to support the Alliance in light of the continuing Soviet threat. Within the first three months of office, he developed a consensus within his government for three major policy departures. Under Mitterrand, France would be firmer in its relations with the Soviet Union, more completely supportive of the Federal Republic of Germany, and cooperative and friendly with the United States.<sup>9</sup>

The early Mitterrand government's reassessment of French strategy resulted in a dual approach which sought both to modernize the strategic nuclear deterrent and expand the level of cooperation with NATO.<sup>10</sup>

The formation of closer Franco-German defense cooperation allowed France a channel through which to voice and demonstrate its commitment to NATO. Mitterrand demonstrated this shortly after the 1982 defense initiative was agreed to with Kohl. On the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Franco-German Treaty, Mitterrand made a most significant and symbolic political gesture in support of NATO. In January of 1983, in a speech to the German Bundestag, Mitterrand unequivocally supported the deployment of Pershing II and Cruise missiles in an attempt to resolve the issue which was causing great discord within the Alliance.<sup>11</sup>

Another reason the French urgently sought closer defense ties



with West Germany, was the political and domestic atmosphere in West Germany. In the early eighties, growing anti-American sentiment as well as neutralistic tendencies in West Germany made the French fearful that their German neighbors would fast become the weak link in NATO. France became especially alarmed in 1981 at the meek response of West Germany to the December imposition of martial law in Poland. Many French analysts interpreted the German indifference to the fate of the Poles as an indication of Germany's anxiety about its own security before the Soviet threat.<sup>12</sup> It was becoming apparent to the French that they had to take on more of the burden of ensuring that West Germany was an effective and reasonably contented member of the Western Alliance.<sup>13</sup> The continued talk of the Germans about their national identity, and their insistence on continuing a dialogue with the east, only increased anxiety among the Western allies and made clear the need to find ways to further entangle the Federal Republic of Germany to the West. The growing distrust in certain NATO capitals of Germany's commitment to the West, and its lack of firmness on defense issues, made the formulation of a new German policy by the French appear imperative.

#### German Motivations to Begin the New Defense Dialogue

The West German Government had been concerned about France's commitment to the Alliance since de Gaulle's withdrawal of France from NATO's integrated command in 1966. More disconcerting to the German Government than the questionable commitment of the French to wider NATO defense, was France's uncertain commitment to the

defense of West Germany territory. Franco-German relations were on good enough terms that the Germans forces could likely count on the geographical depth and supply lines offered by France, but the defense of West Germany by France was another question. Ironically, the uncertain position of France toward the defense of German territory by French conventional and nuclear weapons, prompted the use in German circles of the term "incertitudes françaises" (an obvious allusion to the well used French term: "les incertitudes allemandes" in reference to West German overtures to the east).<sup>14</sup>

France's stance on the use of French nuclear forces to assist NATO in a crisis remained ambiguous throughout the early eighties. The French were determined to maintain the freedom of independent decision making as to how, when and why French nuclear forces might be used. The increased tensions between the East and West in the early eighties increased the need to seek a commitment from the French of nuclear force support. Perhaps more urgent to the West Germans, however, was the issue of French conventional support.

Increased East-West tensions highlighted the already crucial need of NATO and West Germany for the conventional support of the French Army. In 1982, it was still uncertain as to whether French conventional commitment would continue in the form of a vague reserve role or progress to a more participative role in forward defense. What concerned the Germans most was Mitterrand's pledge, shortly after attaining office, to modernize France's strategic

nuclear weapons force. Mitterrand's goal could be realistically achieved only at the expense of conventional force funding, thereby suggesting a weakening of French conventional capability to reinforce the central front of NATO and, consequently, West Germany. These concerns increased the need for the Germans to pursue a stronger defense dialogue with France.

The timing for a new Franco-German defense dialogue was also right with respect to West Germany's political woes. West Germany was finding it more and more difficult to look east, under the sharp criticism of some of its allies, without further anchoring itself to the West. A deeper Franco-German defense agreement would accomplish that. Afterall, if France could live with West German overtures to the east, who could complain?

Additionally, both France and Germany saw the establishment of closer Franco-German defense ties as having the benefit of meeting America's continued call for the European allies to do more on their part for the Alliance.

The 1982 defense initiative, and the successful cooperative efforts which soon followed, have revealed a common purpose of the French and West German governments: to strengthen the Alliance with their cooperation in military and security policies, to bolster the presence of American forces in Europe, particularly on German soil, to support forward defense in the Central Region, and to facilitate French participation in the common defense and in NATO's 'crisis management.'<sup>15</sup>

The commitment to a more and deeper integrated defense

dialogue also represents a move toward establishing a new level of trust in the Franco-German relationship. After all, what greater trust could there be between two countries than to allow the coordination and possible integration of various aspects of their armed forces. The new defense initiative promised to be one of the biggest tests for the bilateral relationship but also offered the prospect of a much stronger partnership.

#### NATO and Franco-German Conventional Force Cooperation

Some of the first displays of enhanced defense cooperation occurred in the conventional arena of defense. Later, as the French and Germans became more comfortable with sharing defense concerns, the more sensitive issue of nuclear defense was breached. One of the first examples of conventional force coordination was initiated by the French in the form of the Force d'Action Rapide.

**The Rapid Reaction Force.** The French Force d'Action Rapide (FAR), or Rapid Reaction Force, is a recently formed mobile force which originated in response to concerns in and outside of France about the ability of French conventional forces to reinforce NATO. The Franco-German dialogue played an important role in the formulation of the final structure and mission of the unit, making it a credible reinforcing force along NATO's central front.

A major aspect of the traditional French Gaullist concept of defense was to ensure that France's defense forces remained independent yet credible. A 1972 French White Paper, however, cast considerable doubt as to the ability of the French First Army

to fulfill its planned role as a NATO reserve force. The Paper essentially suggested that the planned deployment and use of French conventional forces, to include the plan to keep them under strict French command and control upon entering the NATO battlefield, would render them ineffective.<sup>16</sup>

In response to this shortcoming, the French looked at several alternatives, from which the Force d'Action Rapide (FAR) was chosen. One of the major purposes of the new force was to eliminate any doubts as to France's ability to fulfill its NATO mission.<sup>17</sup> The final presentation and shape of the new FAR, as it emerged in late 1982, however, is suggested by German officials to have been significantly influenced by the Franco-German confidential defense dialogue which began a year earlier.<sup>18</sup> The final product represented one of the most concrete aspects of Mitterrand's efforts to reassure Germany and served as an excellent source of momentum for the new Franco-German defense initiative.

The move suggested new thinking on the part of the French; the French no longer viewed West Germany as a buffer between France and the Soviet Union. The French would have to become committed to the security of West Germany if its own security was to be assured. A 1985 survey revealed that nearly three fifths of the French felt that France should rush to the aid of West Germany if the latter were seriously threatened.<sup>19</sup> The French Defense Minister in 1983, Charles Hernu, as well as the newly appointed commander of the FAR, went so far as to describe the force as

having the capability to participate in the forward defense of West Germany.<sup>20</sup>

A FAR was created with two missions in mind: to provide a rapid intervention force that would signal France's official entry into any conflict on the Central Front, and to provide rapid defense forces to any regional conflicts such as in Lebanon and Chad.<sup>21</sup> The FAR is made up of five divisions and totals some 47,000 men. The FAR includes the Eleventh Parachute Division, the Ninth Marine Division, the Twenty-seventh Alpine Division, one light armored division, a large air-mobile unit comprised of 120 antitank helicopters, forty support helicopters, and eighty maneuver helicopters. The force is armed with 600 of the latest antitank weapons and has the capacity to be transported 200 kilometers from the initial zone of deployment.<sup>22</sup>

The weak link in the FAR is the lack of heavy tanks, but that is countered by the substantial amount of antitank weapons and antitank helicopters. The biggest plus for the force is its large helicopter component enabling the force to react with the speed that will be needed to plug any holes that might arise in NATO's defenses.

The value of the FAR as a credible mobile reserve force to NATO is substantial. NATO has precious few mobile reserves ready for battle. Consequently, the French Rapid Reaction Force could play a crucial role in reinforcing the Central Army Group in the event of a breakthrough in the first two or three days of fighting.<sup>23</sup> The problem, however, is that the role of the FAR is

still not quite clear. Although the Defense Minister has suggested that the force has the potential to be deployed in the forward lines of NATO's defense, he has been careful to deny that the force represents any substantive move toward reintegration with NATO.<sup>24</sup> The problem is that the French themselves are caught between the Gaullist notion of an independent and credible French military force, and the need to strengthen their commitment to NATO:

Within France the government's new FAR has been the subject of vigorous discussion and criticism. The government has been severely criticized for the changes in French doctrine which the deployment of the FAR seems to imply. During the all-night debate of December 2, 1983, in the French senate... several members of the opposition prominently displayed the newspaper article by the FAR commander suggesting a NATO role for this force. The mere appearance of such a role carries with it the air of illegitimacy to many French citizens.<sup>25</sup>

The Germans, too, have questions about the role of the FAR. Discussions within the Framework of the formal and informal Franco-German security groups have centered around the FAR and the implications its deployment would have on logistics, air rights, relationship with other units, as well as questions on such wider topics as FAR's impact on French tactical nuclear doctrine and targeting.<sup>26</sup>

Indeed, the questions pertaining to the deployment of FAR are many, but one thing is for sure. If and when FAR is deployed, command and control, as well as air support, will have to be somehow coordinated within NATO channels. Hernu himself, in 1983, admitted that any FAR operation in Europe would have to come

under SACEUR command and would depend on NATO air support and logistics.<sup>27</sup> The problem is matching the need for closer French coordination with NATO command channels and French insistence on remaining independent from the integrated NATO command.

**Joint Franco-German Exercise.** Here, again, Franco-German cooperation has played an important role in finding a solution to a sensitive issue involving European defense. The special defense relationship between France and West Germany has paved the way for joint Franco-German military maneuvers, allowing the French to become acquainted with some of NATO's official integrated command structure.

The first Franco-German joint maneuver took place in June of 1985, and involved some 4600 French and West German troops. A larger joint exercise was conducted in autumn of 1986, labeled Franconian Shield, in which approximately 150,000 French and West German soldiers participated. But perhaps the most significant joint exercise took place in September of 1987. The joint maneuver, named Cheeky Sparrow, marked the first time the French FAR participated in a joint French and German exercise, it was also conducted farther east than any previous exercise, was the first time French and German forces exercised at the Corps level, and experimented with integrated Franco-German command structures.<sup>28</sup>

The "Cheeky Sparrow exercise saw forces of the French FAR deploy to Bavaria in response to a call for help from the West German II Corps. Within two days, nearly 20,000 men and 500



armoured vehicles of France's FAR joined their German comrades in a combined effort to throw back the opposing forces. Particularly impressive was the usefulness displayed by the airmobile division of the FAR with its large contingent of anti-helicopters. The speed, long range, and tank killing capability of the helicopters could be particularly advantageous to NATO in a real war scenario.<sup>29</sup>

One of the goals of French participation in 'Cheeky Sparrow' was to establish the ability of France to protect its European neighbors without being an active member of NATO. This was only partially achieved; the exercise also demonstrated coordination problems caused by French unfamiliarity with NATO procedures and the restriction imposed by French politicians on the use of NATO command-and-control arrangements.<sup>30</sup> The promise of continued Franco-German joint exercises, however, suggest that French forces will become increasingly familiar with NATO procedures and French politicians, with the benefit of time and practical lessons, may ease the restraint on French use of NATO command-and-control arrangements.

A clearer outcome of the joint exercise, one undoubtedly recognized by the official Warsaw Pact observers present, was the demonstration of French resolve to come to the aid of its West German neighbor, as well as respond to an attack on NATO. The 'Cheeky Sparrow' exercise reinforced French efforts to reassure the Germans of France's commitment to the forward defense of West Germany. 'Cheeky Sparrow,' combined with the previous 1986

Franconian Shield exercise involving the deployment of French reserve forces into West Germany, are also tangible proof of France's commitment to NATO.<sup>31</sup>

For NATO, Franco-German joint exercises provide a positive example of practical military cooperation aimed at strengthening the Alliance. Additionally, the renewed French commitment to NATO defense, made possible by the 'back door' relationship to NATO via Franco-German defense cooperation, provides a clear political and military signal, thereby enhancing European security.<sup>32</sup>

**The Franco-German Brigade.** While the French FAR and subsequent joint exercises represent a roundabout way for the Franco-German relationship to make a contribution to NATO and European security, the newly formed Franco-German brigade offers more direct defense implications.

The idea for the joint brigade originated from Helmut Kohl's suggestion in June of 1987 to form a mixed brigade to operate in the defense of Europe.<sup>33</sup> In the wider scheme of things, the Franco-German brigade, still very much in its infancy, is intended to give practical expression to the concept of common defense and mutual commitment.<sup>34</sup> There is little doubt that some of the traditional motives behind Franco-German defense cooperation also come into play: the French see the move as further assurance against West German neutrality, and the Germans hope the move will further commit the French to the conventional defense of Europe. The joint unit also serves as a tangible symbol of the mutual trust and cooperation between the two countries.

Progress on constructing the unit has been slow. This is in large part due to the original vagueness of the unit's mission. When Kohl and Mitterrand ordered, in late 1987, that the brigade be established, the mission of the joint unit was left up to their respective military staffs to decide. In October of 1988, the brigade's task was finally decided upon; it would be to assist in the defense of the rear areas of West Germany. These areas are behind the front line and not under the control of NATO forces. They have traditionally been assigned to the West German Territorial Commands which are comprised of both regular and reserve forces. The new arrangement is convenient in that it allows the French to be integrated with forces that are not associated with NATO, thereby allowing the French to save face on their stance of independence from NATO, and allowing the Germans to proceed without sacrificing units formally designated to specific NATO missions.<sup>35</sup>

With the mission of the joint brigade determined, the complete fill of the unit remains to be accomplished. By October 1989, the first combat units, two West German battalions and a French one, were in place. The main striking force of the unit, a French armored battalion, is not due until autumn of 1990.

Although the unit is not completely formed, some criticism of the joint venture has begun to surface. Some question is raised as to the unit's relationship to the Alliance when one of its members is still clearly not a part of the NATO integrated command. That is not so important if the joint initiative remains

confined to a brigade, but if the long-range intention is to eventually unite the French and German Armies, as suggested by former West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, then serious problems between the joint efforts and NATO could arise.<sup>36</sup> A more detailed discussion of the Franco-German relationship as the core of a European pillar within NATO will be provided in Chapter IV.

The likelihood of a complete merger of the French and German armies is extremely slim but, short of that, the joint ventures seem to offer a great deal to European security. The Franco-German brigade has yet to stir up the same debate in France which surrounds the controversial use of the FAR in a direct NATO role.<sup>37</sup> Instead, the Franco-German brigade seems to be an arrangement unique to France and Germany, which serves as an example of successful defense integration for other NATO countries.

An early prediction of the Franco-German brigade's potential for sparking further European defense integration appeared in the December 1987 issue of NATO Review in an article entitled "Franco-German cooperation - Supportive of the Alliance and of Europe," The author, Lothar Rühl, suggested that

[T]he Franco-German experiment will offer other Allies useful information and experience for similar joint units in Europe and it may also serve as an example for the European partners in the NATO integrated structure of how sections of their land forces could be interlinked.<sup>38</sup>

Less than a year later, in October of 1988, news leaked of a scheme by NATO commanders for a much more powerful joint formation, apparently modeled after the Franco-German joint

effort. A new joint airmobile division has been proposed which would largely be comprised of West German and British forces and consist of three brigades: one attack helicopter brigade, one transport helicopter brigade, and one armored brigade. Most of the division's equipment and manpower would be provided by Britain and West Germany, with the Dutch and Belgians contributing parts, or all, of their excellent commando units.<sup>39</sup> The concept is still just an idea, but it strongly suggests the exemplary effect the Franco-German brigade has had on NATO commanders.

An additional benefit of the joint brigade is that it has led the way to an agreement between France and West Germany for strengthening ties of tactical and operational cooperation. In 1988, the Franco-German "Council for Defense and Security" was formed with the long-term objective of increasing the interoperability between the two countries ground forces. The plan calls for the harmonizing of rules and regulations for tactics and operations, as well as the joint education of general staff officers and commanders at the division level and above.<sup>40</sup> This long-term commitment to coordinate operations increases the likelihood that the French will become more familiar with NATO procedures and thus become a more effective ally in time of war.

#### Franco-German Nuclear Defense Cooperation

In the realm of nuclear cooperation, contributions to Franco-German defense relations obviously must come primarily from the French. There is a problem, however, in that the French independent nuclear stance, a strong Gaullist tradition backed by

a substantial commitment to the maintenance of the French independent nuclear deterrent (*force de frappe*), has long been defended by the French government. It is also basic to France's independent strategy of defense. There is, therefore, an inherent contradiction between France's insistence on independence and national integrity in defense policy, and its foreign policy stance as a close partner of Germany and a committed "European" power.<sup>41</sup> This contradiction in defense orientation has caused some controversy over the previously mentioned conventional force initiatives taken by the French. The controversy surrounding the nuclear arms issue, however, is much greater.

The original concept of the separate *force de frappe* was designed to further the independence of France and enhance France's influence so as to give it a seat at the world table.<sup>42</sup> To that end, the French developed a nuclear triad of land, air and sea based weapons. Later, in 1970, the French incorporated the concept of tactical nuclear weapons into their doctrine but made careful stipulations for their use. The tactical nuclear capability was to be used only as a last "warning shot" to any would be aggressor, just prior to the use of strategic nuclear force. That idea was sound so long as France supported the gaullist notion of an independent nuclear deterrent that would "sanctuarize" only France. The progress of Franco-German relations, however, have complicated the French nuclear formula.

The West Germans certainly were not comfortable with the idea of the last French warning shot, in the form of the older,

shorter-range Pluton missile, being fired on West German soil. Franco-German cooperation created a sensitivity on the part of the French to this issue. The modernized Hadés tactical nuclear missile, scheduled to enter service in the early 1990s, will have a range of 350 kilometers as opposed to the Plutons 120 Kilometers and was developed by the French to enable them to separate the last warning strike from the operations of the First Army on the German side of the Rhine. The increased range and accuracy of the new missile enhances its ability to serve as a warning but also presents other complications.<sup>43</sup>

The West Germans are relieved that the Hadés gives the French the capability to fire a last warning shot on other than West or East German soil. In an effort to enhance Franco-German relations, President Mitterrand announced, in an October 1987 speech in Brühl, that the French nuclear weapons would hit 'the aggressor' and that the warning signal would not be sounded on German territory.<sup>44</sup> In addition, the Paris-Bonn security and defense connection was tightened by the 1986 agreement for wartime consultation. Under the proposed agreement, a conference would take place between the two nations leaders in the event that France found it necessary to use strategic weapons within the West German border.<sup>45</sup>

The new capability at the tactical nuclear level has other possible consequences as well. The Giscard d'Estaing administration of the mid seventies first introduced the concept of an "enlarged sanctuary" that would also include West Germany.<sup>46</sup>

The Hadés missile encourages such a concept. The idea of enlarging the French sanctuary, however, infuriates Gaullists who feel this will destroy the notion of an independent French nuclear force and will limit French options on wartime nuclear response. The future neutron warhead planned for the Hadés missiles is also causing debate as its new capability will make it an excellent candidate for battlefield use. While these debates continue, the fact remains that the Hadés represents a tactical nuclear strike weapons that may well find a use in tomorrow's war, regardless of the squabbles of today's politicians.

With regard to the impact of Franco-German nuclear defense dialogue on NATO, the cooperative efforts of the two countries go a long way toward solving some of NATO's most pressing concerns about the use of French nuclear forces. One of NATO's greatest fears is that the uncoordinated use of the French "warning shot" may give the Warsaw Pact justification to use nuclear force against existing NATO ground forces in West Germany. The agreement by the French to consult their German neighbors before the use of nuclear weapons on German soil would likely preclude such a disaster. In consulting each other on targets and timing of nuclear weapons, it is implied that some type of coordination with NATO operations will take place. It is also likely that the West Germans will continue to press the French to clarify the role of their nuclear weapons.<sup>47</sup> Both measures are advantages to NATO and thereby contribute positively to Western European security.

The French nuclear force de frappe has, in some sense, always



been an advantage to NATO in that it poses an unknown, complicating any Warsaw plans for attack. The French have also been careful to exempt their independent nuclear force from any East-West nuclear force reduction negotiations. The introduction of the Hadés tactical nuclear weapon, largely in response to German concerns for a longer-range French nuclear weapon, will increase Soviet uncertainty as to when France might cross the nuclear threshold.<sup>48</sup>

The Hadés joins the French nuclear force capability already considered independent of current negotiations on East-West nuclear force reductions. The introduction of the new tactical nuclear weapon, as influenced by the Franco-German defense dialogue, will further enhance Western European security.

The above mentioned nuclear and conventional defense initiatives enhance NATO's effectiveness and demonstrate the important role that the Franco-German relationship plans in setting an example for defense integration as well as providing the French with a crucial 'back door' access to NATO. It is unlikely that French forces will, anytime in the near future, station units in the forward defense of NATO, as this would signify a clear reintegration of French forces into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but just short of this, a great deal is possible. The pattern of close French identification with NATO extends beyond the larger defense initiatives described above. Since the beginning of the new Franco-German defense dialogue in 1982, the French have felt at ease to make other concrete gestures

toward greater commitment to the defense of West Germany and NATO. The French have reoriented the entire French army toward the north and east of the country. France has also permitted U.S. bombers to refuel in French air space for the first time since 1966, and French naval forces, including the aircraft carrier Foch, participated fully in the NATO sea maneuvers, Safari '83, in June of the same year.<sup>49</sup> In addition, detailed wartime cooperation with NATO has been worked out between French and NATO commanders, possibly including some nuclear targeting, but has been kept secret to avoid political embarrassment of the French.<sup>50</sup>

In this chapter, I have presented the Franco-German defense initiative of 1982 and have discussed its significance as the most profound demonstration, to date, of trust between the two former enemies. I have pointed out several factors contributing to 1982 being chosen as the year in which to depart on the significantly deeper level of cooperation. Heightened east-west tensions, the ripening confidence which the partnership nurtured within the EC, and motivations for closer coordination in security to include France's concern about West German neutral tendencies and West Germany's worries about uncertain French conventional force support of the central front.

I have also made clear that the new initiative for deeper defense cooperation between the two countries not only strengthens the Franco-German relationship, but also contributes significantly to NATO's effectiveness by allowing the French a back door to cooperation with NATO. The creation of the French FAR, for

example, reinforces France's commitment to the defense of West Germany while simultaneously eliminating doubt about France's ability to perform its NATO mission. Franco-German joint exercises provide the means for practical coordination between the two armies but also allows the French to become acquainted with NATO procedures. The Franco-German brigade represents the most tangible symbol of cooperation between the two armed forces. It also serves as a model for European defense integration as attested to by its use by NATO commanders as a blueprint for a proposed four country integrated airmobile division.

The closer coordination on defense complicates the French nuclear formula by making the French sensitive to the concerns of its neighbor and friend, West Germany. Their 1986 agreement for wartime consultation on the use of nuclear weapons is welcomed by those in NATO who fear the uncoordinated use of French nuclear weapons in Europe.

In short, the Franco-German defense initiative has added a new and stronger dimension to their bilateral relationship and has achieved what the two countries have publicly espoused as their common purpose: to strengthen the Alliance with their cooperation over military and security policy, to bolster the presence of American forces in Europe, to support the forward defense in the Central Region, and to facilitate participation in the common defense as well as any NATO crisis.<sup>51</sup>

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## CHAPTER IV

### THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

In the previous chapter, I discussed the new and closer defense relationship between the French and Germans and explained how the various conventional and nuclear cooperative efforts were beneficial to NATO and the security of Western Europe. Some NATO officials, however, disagree. They fear that the close Franco-German relationship in defense could weaken NATO by forming an alliance within the Alliance. Such a smaller alliance need not be limited to just France and West Germany. A hint of the possible nature of the smaller alliance within NATO was first suggested by the French President, Francois Mitterrand, when, just a month after the signing of the Franco-German defense initiative in October of 1982, he suggested that closer European cooperation within NATO might follow on from the new Franco-German military dialogue. Less than a year later, the French began pushing for the revival of the Western European Union (WEU) as the basis for a European pillar within NATO.

In this chapter, I will discuss how the Franco-German relationship contributes to European security through the WEU. I plan to show how the Franco-German relationship played a crucial role in bringing about the revival of the WEU in 1984 and how the WEU, as led by the Franco-German relationship, remains supportive and beneficial to the NATO Alliance.

I will begin by discussing why the international political

and security climate was right in 1984 for the revival of the WEU. I will then explain the importance of the Franco-German relationship in keeping alive the idea of a workable European identity in defense matters as well as in providing the core consensus for launching the revival of the WEU. The motivations of both France and West Germany to support the renewal of the WEU will also be discussed.

I will then present the revival proposal itself, with mention of the official objectives proposed by the original seven member nations. Discussion will then depart on an analysis of the perceived contribution of the WEU as a European pillar within NATO. Both positive and negative arguments will be presented with a comment on how the Franco-German relationship influences the perception of the WEU's role within NATO. I will conclude with a look at the possible role and likely success of the revived WEU.

#### Why 1984?

One of the strongest motives for reactivating the WEU in 1984 was the need of Europeans for a stronger European identity in defense matters. The defeat of the EDC had made European defense cooperation taboo for many years and had allowed NATO to provide for the defense needs of Europe. The need for a greater European identity in defense matters, however, never diminished and was particularly encouraged by the French who, under de Gaulle, openly rejected U.S. leadership in Europe.

The move to reactivate the WEU in 1984 was not the first of such attempts to increase European defense cooperation. The



revival of the WEU was unsuccessfully attempted earlier, in November of 1973, in the form of a proposal presented by Michel Jobert to the French Assembly. Jobert called for the revival and strengthening of the WEU as a European forum for defense cooperation in response to what was widely viewed as a growing challenge from the U.S. in foreign policy and defense. The European nations were especially disappointed with U.S. actions during the October 1973 Middle East War, when U.S. conventional and nuclear forces in Europe were put on alert before their host governments were informed, and when German and Dutch ports were used to provide military assistance to Israel. The proposal eventually failed, however, in the ensuing confrontations between Jobert and Kissinger. West Germany's refusal to lend support to any move toward worsening the already existing crisis in the Alliance largely contributed to the proposals defeat.<sup>1</sup> More importantly, the climate was not yet right for such a bold move toward greater European defense identity. The taboo against European defense cooperation was still too great.

During the latter half of the 70's and early 80's a number of developments in European politics and national perspectives resulted in a weakening of that taboo. One of the most important was the successful evolution of European Political Cooperation (EPC) as a useful forum within the EC for foreign ministers to discuss security issues. Additionally, vehement public protest in Europe over INF and NATO's nuclear strategy reflected a widespread perception that European defense was being overpowered by American

interests. Thirdly, European concern about the less than equal 'two-way street' between and U.S. defense industries, increasing controls on the transfer of technology from the U.S., and tighter budgets within NATO combined to push European governments toward common procurement.<sup>2</sup> Fourth, Europeans were becoming skeptical about American Soviet bilateralism in nuclear arms control, American SDI plans, and repeated calls for American troop withdrawals. Finally, there was a growing need for a wider way to show solidarity of European cooperation that was bogged down by agricultural surpluses and budgetary arguments within the European Community.<sup>3</sup>

Riding on the momentum of the movement for greater Europeanization of defense, an Italian-German initiative known as the Genscher-Columbo plan, authored by the foreign ministers of the two countries, was introduced to the EC in November of 1981. The plan attempted to strengthen the common European outlook towards defense by enlarging the scope of the EPC to include all major dimensions of collective security. The initiative was effectively dismantled, however, by the Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart in June of 1983 due to the reluctance of some of the EC countries, particularly Greece, Ireland, and Denmark, to deal with defense issues within the framework of the EC. With the failure of the Genscher-Columbo Plan it became evident that a forum other than the EC would be necessary effectively to deal with defense issues within Europe.

### The Franco-German Relationship Paves the Way

There is a broad consensus among political scientists as well as Western politicians that the hard core of the Europeanization of defense is the understanding and cooperation between France and West Germany.<sup>4</sup> The momentum for so-called Europeanization could have been lost with the defeat of the Genscher-Columbo Plan had it not been for the strong example of European defense cooperation demonstrated by the Franco-German defense initiative of 1982. The success of their initiative, combined with increased pressure from the United States for Europe to do more for her own defense, convinced both France and West Germany that the reactivation of the WEU was in order and timely. For the French, the revival of the WEU represented a way for France to regain influence in European defense without having to make a humiliating return to the NATO military organization. The revival of the WEU was also a major plank of Mitterrand's European policy almost from the start. For West Germany, a revived WEU was a means of getting rid at last of the post-1945 controls on their armed forces (with the exception of the ban on nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons which the Germans themselves agreed to continue), as well as a means for securing French commitment to European defense.<sup>5</sup> West German support for the French proposal to revive the West European Union as a forum for European defense cooperation was further justified by a senior German official as having the advantage of "2 plus 5": that is, of providing a multilateral framework for the core Franco-German dialogue.<sup>6</sup> Similar to the

established pattern of Franco-German leadership in the EC, the proposal for reactivating the WEU was first initiated after close bilateral consensus of the two heavyweights of European defense cooperation: France and West Germany. The other members of the WEU - Britain, Italy, and the three Benelux countries - then decided to go along.<sup>7</sup>

The Franco-German relationship may prove to be responsible for more than just the WEU's revival. The strong bilateral partnership between France and West Germany, now enlarged to include close defense cooperation, will likely play a leading and initiative taking role in the WEU as it has in the EC.

#### The Reactivation Journal

After many months of planning, the official reactivation of the WEU took place on October 1984, at the treaty's 30th anniversary session. The seven member nations agreed upon a common declaration which states the WEU's three basic objectives: to strengthen peace, to promote unity and the progressive integration of Western Europe, and to promote closer links with other European organizations. The members also pledged to deal with the problems of arms standardization and disarmament as well as crisis beyond NATO's boundaries.<sup>8</sup>

Just as important as the pledges toward greater European defense cooperation was the rebuilding of the organization to make it more efficient in carrying out those goals. At this same meeting, a commitment was made to upgrade the WEU to include defense and foreign ministers who would meet at least two times a

year, and more if deemed necessary by extraordinary circumstances. The length of the Presidency of the WEU was to be changed to an annual rotation basis, and the structures of the Permanent Council and of the Secretariat-General was to be rehailed to increase efficiency. Lastly, improvements in the consultation procedures between the WEU's Council and Assembly were called for.<sup>9</sup>

Following the October meeting, the upbeat feeling and hopefulness for the future effectiveness of the WEU, was summed up in the remarks offered by the German foreign minister. Genscher praised the agreement on "intensive and in-depth cooperation between the seven member states in security and defense" and said that the revival of the WEU would bring a "new and important dimension to the process of European unification."<sup>10</sup>

#### The Purpose of Reactivating the WEU

The reactivation of the WEU by the seven original member nations in 1984 (now nine, including Spain and Portugal) was designed to address the following concerns:

- To revive and make effective the sole European institution which has explicit responsibilities in security and defense matters, and which is legally entitled to deal with almost any defense issue.

- To allow for a forum outside of EC membership which would allow free discussions on major issues of European Foreign and security policy without the intervention or impasses created by those members of the EC who would take little part in security issues.

- To provide a basis for a stronger European pillar within NATO which would address specific European defense concerns yet still be supportive of NATO as a whole.

- To enhance European defense industry cooperation and coordination in the making of major arms purchases from the U.S., as well as

overcoming protection of defense industries by European governments resulting in high costs, redundancy, and incompatible arms and equipment.

- To allow for the lifting of the 30-year-old restrictions on West German conventional armament to include long-range missiles and strategic bombers (West Germany wanted to and does remain bound to nonpossession of atomic, biological, and chemical weapons).

- To increase the commitment of the European allies to European defense.

The strengthening of European defense cooperation is, in general, an attempt to adjust the Atlantic alliance to the changes that have taken place in the balance between the United States and Western Europe.<sup>11</sup> It would therefore seem that the reactivation of the WEU represents a logical step towards greater European defense coordination. There are those, however, who do not agree, and see the WEU as causing as many problems as it is intended to solve.

One of the revised WEU's stated objectives has been to promote closer links and avoid duplication of effort with other European security related organizations, such as NATO's IEPG and the EDC. The problem is that avoiding overlap and duplication among the different organizations is much easier said than done. So far, the WEU has not been very successful in this area which has led to friction between the different security related groups. There are other concerns as well. Critics of the WEU's revival are particularly fearful that the new "European pillar" within NATO will adversely affect the Alliance.

### A European Pillar within NATO

Active bilateral discussion on politico-military issues has taken place in various degrees between most European NATO members, but there has been a growing need for a European forum in which foreign and defense ministers could come together to discuss security and defense concerns without the dominating presence of the United States.<sup>12</sup> The WEU falls easily into the role of providing a strong foundation for a European pillar within NATO. It is not clear, however, as to whether or not a European pillar within NATO will strengthen or weaken the Alliance.

An early supporter of the concept of a European pillar within NATO was the late Franz-Josef Strauss, the German Defense minister from 1957 to 1962, and noted politician in subsequent years. As early as 1960, in a speech to the WEU Assembly in May, he declared that the Atlantic alliance:

must be based on two pillars. It must have two functioning reliable components, the North American component and the West European component...It is not only a question of the division of military tasks; it is primarily a question of political insight, that of the recognition of reciprocal dependence.<sup>13</sup>

Critics of a European pillar within NATO disagree with Strauss and sight numerous reasons why the European effort will weaken NATO. One of the biggest fears is that the European contingent of NATO, in the form of the WEU, would meet together to solidify a "European" solution or approach to a given defense problem and then offer it to "NATO as a take it or leave it proposition."<sup>14</sup> Additionally, it is argued that the WEU initiative

will turn out to be exclusive rather than inclusive. This would have the disadvantage of broadening the already existing gap between larger and smaller countries and aggravating 'free rider' tendencies of smaller countries as well as reducing their contribution to NATO defense efforts.<sup>15</sup> The inclusion of Spain and Portugal into WEU in 1988, however, has done much to negate this argument.

A still larger problem posed by a European pillar within NATO is the feared impact it might have on American resolve to remain committed to Europe. The very thought of promoting arms collaboration outside of NATO is perceived by some as anti-American. The signals coming from the U.S. do not help the Europeans' feelings of anxiety. On the one hand, the Department of State espouses a policy of support for the WEU and any larger European role in defense so long as it is within NATO, yet on the other hand, some State Department officials have made known that they see no need for the revitalization of the WEU and feel that cooperation in armaments can best be handled by Eurogroup.<sup>16</sup>

The fears that NATO might not survive an increased European leadership role prompted one official to comment:

If NATO cannot withstand further European cooperation, if the American commitment to Europe is so fragile, then surely Europeans should be cooperating as fast and as hard as possible so as to be able to stand alone against the Warsaw Pact when the day inevitably arrives that the delicate American commitment to Europe is destroyed by a disturbance in some other part of the World.<sup>17</sup>

The European governments involved in the reactivation of the WEU have gone to great lengths to assure other allies that the WEU



is and will continue to be supportive of NATO. In a "platform" adopted by the original seven member nations in October of 1987, the common purpose of the WEU was again underlined: to strengthen the West European defense contribution within the Alliance as well as strengthen European influence in security affairs. The British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, stressed in his March 1987 speech in Brussels that the Alliance was to remain the only decisionmaking forum and that the WEU would be a mind-clearing forum where Europeans could develop more coherent, better input to NATO.<sup>18</sup>

The Franco-German partnership has also done its part to relieve anxieties about the intentions of the new European pillar within NATO. The relationship between France and West Germany, the cornerstone of the Atlantic Alliance since its creation in 1949, has long espoused as major objectives the continued contribution of U.S. forces to Europe and the support of NATO. Shortly before the reactivation of the WEU in 1984, the German Defense Minister, Manfred Wörner, appeared in Washington to reassure Americans that Franco-German cooperation including the proposed revitalization of the WEU was totally within the Federal Republic's commitment to NATO. More recently, Lothar Rühl, State Secretary in the Ministry of Defense of the FRG and author of numerous articles on Franco-German military cooperation, emphasized the common purpose of France and West Germany as being one of "providing a firm anchorage for a stronger European contribution to the Alliance and for the continued presence of

U.S. forces in Western Europe."<sup>19</sup> The Franco-German partnership, the motor for European unity, has sent a strong signal that the WEU will remain supportive of the Alliance. The reassurance of the French and Germans, as well as other allies, of the WEU's supportive stance within the Alliance should go a long way towards relieving anxieties of those who are skeptical of the WEU. Additionally, the track record of the new WEU, since its reactivation in 1984, has produced little proof of any disruptive impact on NATO.

The WEU's contributing efforts to European defense cooperation are still far from problem-free. Even if worries about the impact of the WEU as a European pillar within NATO eventually fade, other sore points persist. Problems still exist in trying to coordinate the WEU's efforts with other organizations with similar agendas, such as NATO's Eurogroup (organized within NATO for the coordination of arms procurement) and the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG, formed outside of NATO as a similar organization that France could join and which has effectively superseded Eurogroup).<sup>20</sup> Tensions between the WEU and the EPC also continue despite recognition on the part of WEU officials of the need for closer communication between the two organizations. The inherent difference between the EPC's willingness to deal with security issues and the WEU's open-ended interest in defense and security matters make a compatible relationship difficult.<sup>21</sup> The WEU, in some respects, seems only to add to the proliferation of overlapping institutions that has

been characteristic of post-war Europe. The WEU may fall by the wayside as have other European institutions after the initial excitement has subsided.

There is also another possibility for the WEU. Along with the partial overlap and competition among numerous organizations and institutions of post-war Europe, there has been a pattern of the rise of more effective units and the decline of weaker ones.<sup>22</sup> Perhaps the more successful the WEU becomes, the more likely it will displace the EPC as the major forum for European defense and security discussions. The WEU has the strong advantage of being the only European institution devoted solely to dealing with defense issues. The WEU's role as a pillar within NATO additionally has the potential of increasing public support for defense initiatives within the Atlantic Alliance, as decisions may now be seen as other than American dominated. Whatever success is achieved by the WEU, the progress will probably be incremental.

In an incremental approach to European defense cooperation within the confines of the WEU, it is also likely that the Franco-German relationship will play a leading role. After all, the cooperation of France and Germany has, for many years, been essential in order to achieve the goals of any undertaking in Europe. Their joint interest in the WEU may be the best guarantee of the project's success.<sup>23</sup>

The purpose of this chapter was to show how the Franco-German relationship impacts upon the security of Western Europe through the Western European Union. To accomplish this, I first discussed

the importance of the relationship in serving as an example of European defense cooperation and in keeping alive the drive for a greater European identity in defense matters.

I explained why, because of rising east-west tensions and other security concerns, the push for a European identity in defense grew to a head in 1984. This push, combined with the successful example of defense cooperation between the French and West Germans, and the unwillingness of the EC to accept greater responsibility in defense matters, made the timing right in 1984 for the revival of the Western European Union.

I have discussed the motivations behind the decision by the French and Germans to use the strength of their bilateral relationship as a core of consensus for the revival proposal. The French were largely motivated by the prospect that the WEU would help them regain influence in European defense, while the West Germans primarily saw the WEU as a means to secure French commitment to European defense.

The WEU proposal was presented to include the major reasons of the original seven members for its revival. I then discussed the arguments for and against the WEU as a basis for a European pillar within NATO. Those who feel that a European core within NATO would weaken the Alliance fear that the WEU will be used as a decision making forum, after which solutions will be offered to the Alliance as take it or leave it propositions. Those who feel that the WEU could strengthen NATO see the WEU as a valuable forum for Europeans to discuss European concerns without the

intimidating presence of the United States. They also point to the repeated reassurance by both leaders of the Franco-German partnership that the European pillar within NATO is, and will continue to be, supportive of the Alliance.

In the final part of the chapter I discussed the likely effectiveness and possible role of the WEU in the future. I concluded that the WEU has yet to prove itself and may, like other such grand European designs, fizzle out after the original excitement and enthusiasm has disappeared. If the revived WEU does succeed, it will likely take time and be incremental as it is hindered by its overlapping responsibilities with existing institutions, particularly the EPC.

## Endnotes

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14. Elizabeth Pond, "Europe: A US Pillar or Rival of NATO?" Christian Science Monitor, (July 31, 1987): 32.
15. Eberle, 556.
16. Wells, 387.
17. Trevor Taylor, "European Defence Cooperation," Chatham House Paper 24 (London: RIIA/Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), 300.
18. Pond, 32.

19. Ruehl, 54.

20. For a discussion on interaction between the WEU, Eurogroup, and IEPC see William Wallace's, "Relaunching the Western European Union: Variable Geometry, Institutional Duplication or Policy Drift?" The Reactivation of the Western European Union, Tsakaloyannis.

21. For an indepth treatment of the relationship between the EPC and WEU see Jean-Marc Hoscheit's and Panos Tsakaloyannis's, "Relaunching the Western European Union: An Overview," The Reactivation of the Western European Union, Tsakaloyannis.

22. Alfred Pijpers, "Western European Union and European Political Cooperation: Competition or Complementarity?" The Reactivation of the Western European Union, Tsakaloyannis p. 77.

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## CHAPTER V

### Current Changes In Europe

The year of 1989 will be remembered as the year of Europe. Within the past year the world has witnessed the evolution of economic and political reform within the Soviet Union which eventually led to a loosening of Moscow's grip on the Soviet empire, paving the way for sweeping democratic reform, led by the masses, throughout Eastern Europe. But the year may even more precisely be remembered as the year of Germany. It was the year in which the staunch outpost of communism, East Germany, buckled under the pressure of the masses shouting for democracy, and the year in which West Germany, which sustained and guided the flight of thousands of East Germans to the West, reached out to affect the freedom of its fellow German neighbors. Chancellor Kohl's government effectively brought the discussion of the unification of the two Germanies from theory to widespread acceptance as evidenced by the EC's formal endorsement of Bonn's unification goal at its December 1989 summit.<sup>1</sup> The likely unification of East and West Germany and other developments in Europe are bringing about the most dramatic change in the balance of power in Europe since the end of World War II.<sup>2</sup> These developments are bringing into question the postwar alliance structure as well as the very nature of security in Europe. The institutions of NATO, the EC and the WEU are all likely to be dramatically affected by the changes now taking place. Also likely to be affected is the Franco-German relationship as West Germany begins to take on additional priorities.



The purpose of this chapter of the thesis will be to analyze the current changes in Europe as they affect European security and discuss how the Franco-German relationship might meet the new challenges ahead. The analysis will begin, first, with a discussion of the unification issue followed by a look at how each of the institutions of the EC, NATO and WEU might be effected by German unification and other changes in Europe. Having described how the new security picture in Europe is developing, I will discuss how the Franco German partnership is reacting to the changing European environment.

The democratic change sweeping throughout Eastern Europe will no doubt alter the nature of the alliances as we now know them. The changes will also pose new challenges to the European Community and its involvement in the developments taking place in Eastern Europe; questions concerning membership, economic aid and trade must all be answered. But these problems are not occurring at such a pace that Western officials have not been able to react. As early as November, when changes in Eastern Europe were happening at a dizzying pace, NATO officials met to discuss the possibility of redefining NATO's role as a more political one in the future.<sup>3</sup> The European Community reacted to the changes taking place by stressing, at the December EC summit in Strasbourg, how important it was that the Community remain a point of reference and influence at a time of profound and rapid change. The EC leaders also used the occasion to announce their goals of deeper unity and direct involvement in East European development.<sup>4</sup> In mid-January 1990 the EC foreign ministers met in Dublin and agreed to develop a comprehensive Community policy toward Eastern Europe and to back

Mikhail Gorbachev's calls to convene an East-West summit of the 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) in Europe as soon as possible.<sup>5</sup>

Although these steps by the officials of NATO and EC represent a timely response to the events happening in Europe, they are only preliminary steps in what will likely be a careful, incremental and well coordinated plan of change in the structure of the alliances and in the way the EC does business with the East. A much more urgent challenge for the leaders of NATO and the EC, one which may not lend itself to such a coordinated approach, is the looming inevitability of the unification of East and West Germany. This change, more so than the other changes occurring in Europe, poses the most urgent threat to the economic and military security of Europe.

#### The Unification Issue

Divided as a consequence of the Cold War, East and West Germans are now finding that the melting of the Cold War provides them with the opportunity to realize their long sought after goal of unifying Germany. Unfortunately, what is a dream for the Germans may be a nightmare for their neighbors. The prospect of a united Germany brings with it renewed fears of an even more powerful economic and military giant situated precariously in the middle of Europe. It also promises to be a major step in the formation of a new European structure.

The unification of the Germanies should be no great problem for the allies who, since the end of the WWII, continually espoused their support for the eventual bringing together of the two Germanies. But perhaps that was because the possibility of it actually happening was

so remote. Now that unification is just around the corner, the allies are feeling a bit anxious. They are anxious about the potential unbridled power of a new Germany - the economic and military power that may not be harnessed as West Germany's was through its early association with NATO and the EC. But, perhaps even more, the allies fear the sense of purpose and independent action being demonstrated by the two Germanies.

At a time when Europe is developing so quickly, without the influence of the superpowers that has been so prevalent in the past, it seems that the Germanies are not only best poised to play a major role between East and West, but that they are the only ones with a definite plan. The Germans are taking charge and steering the course of events in Europe and it is precisely that point which is frightening for other Europeans.

West Germany has, on more than one occasion over the past critical several months, shown its ability and willingness to use its economic strength to achieve its political aims in Europe, particularly the goal of unification with East Germany.<sup>6</sup> West Germany was directly responsible for Hungary's decision in August of 1989 to reopen its frontier with Austria on a permanent basis to allow East Germans to cross to the West. The decision breached Warsaw Pact solidarity and put a hole in the iron curtain. Following the announcement of the decision, the leaders of Hungary and West Germany discussed the subject of aid to Hungary and Budapest's bid for associate membership to the EC. At the end of November, the German's signed over an untied loan of five hundred million marks to the

Hungarians and promised to support Hungary's bid for associate membership to the EC. The Hungarians, in turn, spoke favorably of German unification.<sup>7</sup>

In late November 1989 Chancellor Kohl shocked his allies as well as fellow members of government by announcing his ten-point plan to create a confederation of the two Germanies. The plan, predicated on the multiparty elections in East Germany, outlines the development of common political and economic institutions as part of a series of confederative structures eventually leading to a unification of some type between the two Germanies.<sup>8</sup> The plan caught the world by surprise because it was made with no prior consultation with the other allies, seemingly enforcing Kohl's prior statements that the unification of the Germanies is the right and the decision of the two Germanies.

Kohl's precondition for his plan was met when, on 18 March, East Germany held its first free elections. The conservative coalition won the election under the promise of its leader, Lothar de Maziere, for Western prosperity through quick unification. On 12 April, the new parliament embraced de Maziere as its prime minister, effectively setting up a transitional government whose primary goal will be to negotiate the terms of creating a single Germany. The coalition has already agreed that a united Germany should remain a member of NATO and that East Germany should merge its currency with West Germany.<sup>9</sup> The two Germanies are working out the details in the difficult issue of merging their currencies but are planning to do so as early as July 2, 1990.

The issue of the unification of Germany is well on its way to

becoming a reality and a sooner reality than many had thought or hoped it would be. As the Western allies ponder, the Germanies seem to know where they are going and are consequently running the show. The process of unifying the two Germanies and the other rapidly occurring changes taking place in Europe are creating strains in the Alliance and Community and pose significant complications for the institutions of the EC, NATO and WEU.

#### The European Community and the Changes in Europe

One way to control a unified Germany is to have a unified Europe. The EC's "Europe 1992" project is designed as a major step in achieving that unity but is threatened by the changes occurring in Europe. In response to the complications which these events may pose for the EC, the leaders of Western Europe, as well as the United States, have been adamant in expressing their belief that the EC needs to remain a stable point of reference at a time of whirlwind change in Europe. In a December 1989 summit meeting, the twelve EC leaders declared that "at a time of profound and rapid change, the Community is and must remain a point of reference and influence. It remains the cornerstone of a new European architecture and, in its will to openness, mooring for a future European equilibrium."<sup>10</sup>

The EC has the opportunity to play a key role in the development of events in Eastern Europe. The Eastern countries are now in need of a forum outside of the Warsaw Pact in which to conduct a joint analysis of what is happening in Europe and to try and come up with a coordinated way of alleviating Soviet security fears. The EC could help by opening up a dialogue with the six Eastern countries. The EC

dialogue could be used to discuss future membership in the EC as well as German unification. Such a dialogue could head off the potential problem of a quasi-colonial relationship forming between the rich Western nations and the cheap labor nations of the East.<sup>11</sup> It will not be long before one of the countries of Eastern Europe applies for membership to the EC. How that membership is accepted, however, has a lot to do with how the EC handles the unification issue and the membership of Eastern Europe to the European Community.

West Germany has always been an integral member of the EC and all indications are that a unified Germany will likewise continue to be a member of the EC. The problem is how, and in what form, that membership will come about. Helmut Kohl has already suggested, back in November of 1989, that East Germany be granted associate status.<sup>12</sup> Now, as German unity looks near, things are becoming more complicated and the balance of power in the EC is threatened. It is unlikely that the EC will allow a unified Germany additional votes in the Council of Ministers or a third commissioner in Brussels, as that would give one nation more power than the others. Such is not the case in the European Parliament where Kohl has demanded more seats to represent a unified Germany.<sup>13</sup>

One must also consider the issue of how the other countries will react to the additional burden that a unified Germany will bring to the EC. East Germany will bring with it substantial agricultural difficulties, antiquated industry and a big need for investment capital. France and Britain may use the occasion to insist on the entrance of other countries as well.

Despite the possibility of East Germany slowing the EC and its goal of Europe 1992, all the leaders of the EC seem to be committed to making Europe 1992 work. Rather than slow the prospects for further integration in Western Europe, the changes are having the opposite effect. The possibility that other Eastern countries will soon be knocking on the EC's door has prompted EC leaders and the EC Commissioner Jacques Delors to push for a speeding up of the economic and monetary union. West Germany consequently finds itself in the difficult position of trying to assure the Community that it will aid the speeding up of work on the proposed economic and monetary union, while realizing that by doing so the economic recovery of East Germany will be slowed since investment capital from West Germany, so enormously needed in East Germany, may not be as readily available.<sup>14</sup>

The commitment from the leaders of the EC to see Europe 1992 to completion seems to be well intact, despite the political and economic changes now taking place in Europe. I believe that Europe 1992 will happen because it has to happen in the eyes of European leaders. Only Europe 1992 has the economic and political potential to fill the power vacuum left by the retreating superpowers. It is paramount that the EC remain the stable point of reference around which an emerging Europe can be built by Europeans themselves. The EC will figure out some way to absorb East Germany, but further enlargement of the EC is not likely to occur as EC members will push for deeper integration before allowing the EC policy process to become any more complicated.

But what of the future role of the EC in the security of Europe? Jacques Delors recently stated, that because of the institutional

reform taking place in the EC, "it will be impossible from now on to separate the Community's economic role from its political one."<sup>15</sup> It follows that since there is often a fine line between politics and security, as evidenced by the increased defense role given to the European Political Community (EPC) by the 1987 Single European Act, the EC will not be able to avoid some involvement with issues of security. The EC has, however, a long history of avoiding direct involvement in issues of security (the failure of the Genscher-Columbo Plan is a good example) and will likely leave those issues to NATO or another defense related institution if at all possible. The problem with this approach is that NATO is having difficulties of its own. If NATO does not survive the changes taking place in Europe, the EC may win the responsibility of dealing with defense by default.

#### NATO and the Changes Taking Place in Europe

Of all the institutions of Europe, NATO is the most likely to have the most to do with the emerging European security picture, at least for the next few years. NATO has, for too long, served as the political and military forum for dealing with issues of defense to be discarded with quickly. It is precisely its military-political nature that makes it more suitable than the EC for dealing with the delicate issues that changes in Europe are raising. NATO also represents a needed symbol of security in a time of many unknowns and fast-paced change.

The democratic reforms sweeping Eastern Europe have spelled trouble for the Warsaw Pact which was once known for its solidarity. Soviet forces are being asked to leave some countries, other countries



are pushing to break from the Warsaw Pact. In the Soviet Union itself, there are problems within the armed forces as some of the smaller republics which, like Estonia who has voted an end to military service, refuse to cooperate militarily. The credibility of the Warsaw Pact, and its ability to launch a successful attack against the West, has come into considerable doubt. A recent assessment of the Warsaw threat by NATO reveals that the weakening of the resolve to fight of the Soviet satellite countries comprising the Warsaw Pact has led experts to conclude that NATO can repel a Warsaw attack and do it without the use of short-range nuclear missiles. All these facts also lead to the conclusion that the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, founded amid the fear of cold war escalation, is finding itself with no cold war and no threat from the East.

The fast paced change in Europe, and its implications on security have NATO officials scurrying to decide how the organization might best meet the needs of the future. Perhaps the most complicating problem for NATO is the reunification of Germany. The Soviets have little choice but to accept the realities of losing East Germany, but they are still not ready to accept its incorporation into NATO. If a unified Germany would remain neutral, as the Soviets propose, it would mean an end to NATO and probably U.S. presence in Europe. Yet this option would create an unbridled powerhouse in the middle of Europe.<sup>16</sup>

Everyone else in Europe strongly supports a unified Germany becoming a member of NATO. President Bush, at a NATO summit in December of 1989, went so far as to stipulate the membership of Germany in NATO as one of the four major conditions for support of

German unification.<sup>17</sup> The problem, of course, is how to make that happen and how to make it happen in such a way that the Soviets, already feeling their security in serious jeopardy, will not feel threatened.

One proposal, designed to appease both sides of the security issue, has been offered by the West German Foreign Minister.

Genscher's plan calls for a reunified Germany to be a member of NATO but that no NATO troops would be stationed on what is now East German territory. Genscher has also proposed that Soviet troops be allowed to remain in the East, albeit in lesser numbers, to facilitate joint exercises, exchanges, and other confidence building measures so that German soil would be a place of East-West reconciliation not confrontation.<sup>18</sup> Genscher's plan is one of the best that has been proposed, but poses formidable complications and leaves open some big questions. Would the Bundeswehr forces stationed in the GDR be under national or NATO command? Would the GDR army remain separate, and if not, who would have ultimate command responsibility? Will what was East Germany be a demilitarized zone, and if so, will soldiers be conscripted from that part of the country? While the Genscher plan promises to be less than simple to implement, it does have the advantage of suggesting a new and stronger political mission for NATO, a position which the United States strongly supports.<sup>19</sup> Mikhail Gorbachev, at the December 1989 Malta summit of the two superpowers, suggested that the alliances be "transformed" rather than "dismantled" and that they maintain significant long-term roles in managing the political and economic change sweeping Europe.<sup>20</sup> Shortly after the

Malta summit, U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d outlined a plan for the restructuring of NATO. Under the plan, NATO would be transformed from a primarily military organization to a political alliance. Mr. Baker also suggested new missions for the Alliance to include the establishment of an arms control staff, more involvement in trying to solve regional conflicts, and the assumption of more political and economic responsibilities. Although some diplomats see difficulty in putting the plan's ideas to use, it has been generally well received by European leaders, the majority of whom still desire a U.S. presence in an unstable Europe.<sup>21</sup>

The leaders of NATO seem to support the transformation of NATO to more of a political group rather than a military alliance, (much as was the case with NATO prior to the outbreak of the Korean war). The difficulty will be for a transformed alliance to carve out areas of responsibility in politics and economics in an emerging new European order in which the EC, as bolstered by the Europe 1992 project, will continue to play a larger and larger role in the politics and economics of Europe. To complicate things for any new NATO structure is the recent push, particularly from Moscow, for the renewed use of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as a forum for discussing political, economic, security and cultural matters. One suggestion for NATO's approach to the renewed activity of the CSCE is to use NATO for coordination by member countries prior to CSCE conferences.

It is my opinion that NATO will continue to play an important role, at least in the near future and especially during the transition

Europe is now undergoing. The political, economic and security situation in Europe is still too unstable to do away with the organization which has successfully kept Europe free of war for more than forty years. In addition, the crisis between Lithuania and the Soviet government, which is developing currently, still has the potential of cooling down what was a warming of relations between the two superpowers.

In the coming months NATO will have an uphill battle trying to carve a piece of the economic and political pie in Europe for which a stronger and more confident EC and a newly invigorated CSCE will be competing. One of NATO's advantages is that it represents the lingering presence of the United States and its nuclear security umbrella in Europe. The disadvantage is the stigma that the U.S. dominates the NATO decision process. Such dominance may prove to be unpopular if not intolerable to a Western Europe which will be growing in confidence and clout.

#### The Western European Union and the Changes in Europe

The changes occurring in Europe will also have an impact on the Western European Union (WEU), but the nature of the institution, as little more than a treaty relationship which commits its members to defend one another in time of war, does not lend itself to the spotlight of attention in a rapidly evolving Europe. Said more succinctly, the WEU is the least of the worries of Western leaders who are working overtime just trying to keep the more critical institutions of the EC and NATO in check with the quickly changing European environment.

As NATO officials decide what structural changes will occur within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it is difficult to say what role the WEU, as the European pillar within NATO, will play in the decisions ahead. If the WEU works as planned, it could serve as an important forum in which the Europeans can meet and discuss the important issues and alternatives affecting European security, without the heavy handed presence of the United States.

One scenario, in which the WEU may significantly contribute to the security of Europe, would have the WEU serve as a base for a wider treaty organization among European countries in the event that NATO is dissolved or drastically changed. This view presupposes that a limited pull-out of American forces in Europe would not remain limited. With the exit of the troops, of course, would go the reliability of U.S. nuclear protection, thereby facilitating a decision on the part of the Europeans to plan their own defense rather than rely on uncertain help from the United States.<sup>22</sup>

I do not find this scenario as likely as the scenario in which the WEU continues to play a role within an evolving NATO, albeit a more politically flavored NATO. The WEU should also continue to play an important role in future "out of NATO" defense matters. Additionally, the major reasons for the 1984 revival of the WEU: failure of the EC to adequately deal with security and defense matters and the need for more of a European identity in defense, still remain valid.

#### The Role of the Franco-German Relationship

The Franco-German relationship, born out of the need for reconciliation between the peoples of France and Germany, has been

nurtured by the two countries for more than forty years to bear the current fruits of a solid relationship marked by strong mutual cooperation and trust, the extent of which is evidenced by the defense cooperation between the two countries that is now common place. The recent events in Europe, however, especially the widely accepted likelihood that East and West Germany will unite, has the potential to destroy the strong bond between the two countries.

The current unification issue promises to test the Franco-German relationship to its ultimate limit. For the French, the unification of the two Germanies, particularly if Moscow gets its way and Germany becomes neutral, could become France's worst nightmare. West Germany is France's largest trading partner. A neutral, unchecked, and uncooperative Germany, with its enormous economic and military potential, would pose a great threat to France's security. A unified Germany could also threaten the existence of NATO which the French have been so determined to strengthen over the past decade. There is also fear among some Frenchmen that the Germans will become so powerful that they will longer feel they need to pursue the close relationship with France. The French will be relying on their special relationship with West Germany to pull the two countries through the trying times ahead.

As for the West Germans, their unification efforts and new found role as one of the major forces driving the changes in Europe has raised old fears among many Europeans of a powerful and aggressive Germany. In a difficult time when suspicion surrounds West Germany's every move, they will be looking to France to see if they can truly rely on their friend when things become tough. The high expectations

of each government, however, are seemingly being realized. The actions of the two countries' governments and leaders over the past difficult few months give every indication that the relationship is alive and well and that it will continue to play a leading and stabilizing role in the Europe to come.

With respect to the EC, Kohl and Mitterrand made a joint appearance before the European Parliament on November 22, 1989, assuring the Community that they would not let the gale-force winds of change sweeping across Europe blow them off course. They emphasized the importance of the Community remaining a stable, solid core around which the new Europe would be built and promised that the Community led, as always by France and Germany, would remain committed to completing Europe 1992.<sup>23</sup> Later, in December, as the unification issue began to heat up, Mitterrand voiced his tacit support of a Kohl under fire by repeatedly stating that he does not fear a unified Germany and stating that the unity issue is "a German one."<sup>24</sup> Kohl used the occasion of the mid-January 1990 EC summit not only to endorse Delors' call for a rapid move by the EC toward full political union, a full-fledged foreign policy, and deep institutional reform, but to additionally add that "France and Germany should also be the motor for an even closer foreign policy cooperation of all EC states towards Eastern Europe."<sup>25</sup> On the defense side of the house there was also a show of unity. Almost as if in direct response to those who might doubt the solidarity of Franco-German defense cooperation in a time of turbulent change, the French and West German Governments, on November 30, 1989, approved the joint development of a combat and support

helicopter called the Tiger.<sup>26</sup>

In addition to these concrete displays proving that the Franco-German relationship is alive and well in a Europe, despite the strain of recent events, there are also more subtle, but just as important ways in which the Franco-German relationship is showing its solidarity. The French and West Germans are no doubt stepping up their secret coordination meetings between leaders and important government leaders which normally take place between Franco-German summit meetings. This enables them to advance each crucial step in the building of an emerging new Europe with the advantage of a unified position and a sharing of perspectives which is such an important part of the Franco-German relationship. The French and Germans have seen to it that their highly valued relationship has successfully survived the recent strain caused by the changes in Europe. By doing so, they have increased their own confidence, as well as the confidence of other nations, that the Franco-German relationship will survive the challenges ahead and contribute positively to the security of the Europe of the future.

In this chapter I have discussed the changes taking place in Europe, particularly the unification process occurring between the two Germanies. I have then analyzed the likely impact of those changes on the institutions of the EC, NATO and the WEU. In the final part of this chapter I have looked at how the Franco-German relationship has reacted to these changes. My conclusion is that the Franco-German relationship has held up well under the strain of recent events in Europe which could have otherwise undermined the partnership. The Franco-German relationship remains strong and shows every indication



that it will continue to make a valuable contribution to the security of Europe through its example and leadership in the institutions of the EC, NATO and WEU.

#### Conclusion

The Franco-German partnership has mutually benefited both countries. It has been of value to the French in alleviating their security concerns over their potentially more militarily powerful neighbor, has served to keep Bonn tied to the West, and has been important to France economically. Their combined closely coordinated action in the EC and defense matters has also given France a significant role in the leadership of Europe that might otherwise not have been possible. For the West Germans, the partnership has allowed their country to regain its status as an equal among the Western Allies by enhancing its political legitimacy, it has helped to alleviate fears of other European countries of an emerging economic and military strong Germany, and has allowed the West Germans to keep a strong foothold in the West as a necessary prerequisite for their overtures to the East, particularly their goal of eventual unification of East and West Germany.

Central to the relationship has been, and continues to be, their mutual concern for security. Shortly after the war it served as a point of contention and caused resentment. Today, their mutual cooperation in defense is perhaps their greatest achievement. It reinforces an important ingredient of their relationship: trust. After all, what greater show of trust could there be between two former enemies than the integration of one another's armed forces.

Their relationship has also benefited Europe. Following World War II, the nations of Europe realized that the reconciliation of two of Europe's most bitter enemies was essential to lasting peace in Europe. To that end, the designers of early European integration efforts made sure to include Franco-German rapprochement as a central theme. Franco-German relations were a catalyst for the creation of the ECSC, WEU, and NATO.

The Franco-German treaty of 1963 began a close bilateral relationship that later blossomed into the dynamo of the European Community. Within the confines of the EC, the Franco-German relationship began to play a leading role in the security of Western Europe. As the EC involvement in issues of security grew, first by embracing political security concerns through the EPC and later by becoming involved in defense matters as a result of the Single European Act, so, too, did the influence and role of the Franco-German relationship.

By 1982, the French and Germans had developed enough confidence in their relationship to tackle the previously taboo subject of defense cooperation. Their 1982 defense initiative marked a significant step in the evolution of their relationship of trust and mutual cooperation. The subsequent defense initiatives now serve as positive contributors to the effectiveness of NATO and the security of Western Europe. The French FAR reinforces France's commitment and ability to perform its NATO mission, Franco-German joint maneuvers allow the French to become acquainted with NATO procedures, and the Franco-German joint brigade serves as a model for further European defense integration.

The success of Franco-German defense cooperation paved the way for the revival of the WEU in 1984. The WEU has the potential to be the basis for a European pillar within NATO which could contribute to the Alliance by serving as a forum in which European's can discuss strictly European security concerns. It could also increase European support for NATO decisions which are often criticized by the public as being overpowered by American concerns. The leadership role of the Franco-German relationship in the WEU also contributes to the partnership's influence on Western European security.

The Franco-German relationship has succeeded in working through the institutions of the EC, NATO, and WEU to make a favorable and significant impact upon the security of Western Europe. The relationship has also proven its solidarity in face of the most recent changes in Europe. The two countries have played an important part in stabilizing the political, economic, and military situation in Europe by standing together firmly to support the EC and its plans for 1992, as well as to support the continued role of NATO in Europe. The Franco-German relationship was born out of the need for reconciliation between the two neighbors whose mutual hatred was largely responsible for the past three wars in Europe. Today, the Franco-German relationship, built on trust, mutual understanding, and cooperation, serves as a unifying and stabilizing, rather than destructive force. Crucial to their relationship has been the idea of trust, most significantly embodied in the defense cooperation the two former enemies share. In the years ahead, political and economic temptations will materialize to threaten the relationship, but the

paramount need for reconciliation and trust between these two nations will keep the Franco-German partnership strong and viable. It must, for upon its survival hangs the survival of the two peoples and of Europe.

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